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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Traditional (neoclassical) economic theory predicts that individuals are solely interested in the 
maximization of their own monetary gains and their behavior is exclusively driven by the 
pursuit of their own narrow self-interest. However, vast evidence of experimental and 
empirical studies shows that behavior often deviates from this assumption. The narrow self-
interest hypothesis started to be questioned in the 1980’s when experimental economists 
began to study bilateral bargaining games and interactions in small groups in controlled 
laboratory settings (i.e. Roth et al., 1981; Güth et al., 1982). In recent years, numerous models 
of decisions assume that utility is not exclusively influenced by monetary gains but also take 
concerns for other players into account (i.e. Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 
1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 
2004; Sobel, 2005; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). 
The core of behavioral economics is the refinement of the assumption of perfectly 
self-interested, rationally utility-maximizing agents and the extension of traditional economic 
models by integrating insights from psychology. The concept of homogenously purely self-
interested agents is changed by assuming heterogeneity in interpersonal preferences among 
players and allowing for social preferences for some agents. Social – or other-regarding – 
preferences indicate that people do not solely care about themselves, but are also concerned 
about the payoff of others. Therefore, behavioral economics develop more realistic theories 
and make better predictions about behavior and, hence, increases the predictive power of 
economic models (Rabin, 2002; Camerer & Loewenstein, 2004).  
Broadly speaking, there are three fields of “behavioral anomalies”, i.e. deviations from 
standard theory, in a decision-making process (for a survey, see DellaVigna, 2009).1 First, 
other factors than the maximization of one’s own absolute payoff might influence utility (non-
standard preferences). Second, subjective perceptions of the prospects of certain events might 
be systematically biased (non-standard beliefs). And third, economic agents might have 
cognitive limitations in the decision-making process and therefore use simple heuristics, or 
framing effects and emotions might influence their decisions (non-standard decision-making). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Alternative surveys of studies in behavioral economics are provided i.e. by Earl (1990), Rabin (1998), 
Kahnemann (2003), and Camerer & Loewenstein (2004). 
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This thesis focuses on the first class of behavioral phenomena – non-standard 
preferences – and its application to two different fields of economics. More specifically, we 
scrutinize potential influences of non-standard preferences on contribution behavior in a 
social dilemma (chapter 2), cooperation in intertemporal decision-making (chapter 3) and the 
effect of responsibility on intertemporal choices (chapter 4).  
Social preferences can be divided into three different types (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). 
The first type suggests that an individual cares more about the benefit of another person than 
his own and is captured by models of altruism (Levine, 1998). Another sort of social 
preferences assumes a feeling of covetousness with respect to another person’s advantages, 
which is expressed by models of envy (Bolton, 1991). The third type of social preferences 
assumes that a person does not only take his own absolute payoff into account but also his 
relative payoff in comparison to a given reference group. These distributive preferences are 
captured by models of inequality aversion (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2000).2 Inequality aversion – or fairness concerns – is particularly important for our analysis 
of contribution behavior in a public goods game (chapter 2). Moreover, there are many 
theories that postulate that subjects have a concern for the perceived intentions behind 
economic actions, which are modeled by theories of reciprocity (see Rabin, 1993; 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). When games are repeated, 
reciprocity leads to the behavioral pattern of conditional cooperation. In line with strong 
evidence that reciprocity plays a crucial role for the evolution of contribution behavior in 
public goods games (for a survey see Gächter, 2006), we find that it influences the 
willingness of pre-commitment to (higher) public goods contributions (Chapter 2). 
Second, we focus on intertemporal decision-making in (different aspects of) a social 
context in chapter 3 and 4. In both chapters, we analyze whether the interaction with another 
person has implications for intertemporal consumption decisions. By suggesting an 
experimental design for the joint elicitation of time and social preferences (Chapter 3) as well 
as for the integration of responsibility in an intertemporal choice task (Chapter 4), both 
chapters contribute to the understanding of behavioral regularities that might govern the 
choices in an intertemporal context with social interaction.  
Chapter 3 investigates how individual time preferences interact with social 
preferences. Behavior is analyzed in an intertemporal trust game. Evidence has shown that 
trusting another person is fundamentally different from the assessment of stochastic risk 
generating the same monetary outcomes since people dislike being betrayed by another 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Other models also contain social efficiency concerns (see i.e. Charness & Rabin, 2002). 
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person as compared to a setting where chance (nature) determines the outcome (Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008). Betrayal aversion is in line with the theoretical and 
empirical evidence that people care about others’ intentions. Our results confirm the existence 
of betrayal aversion in an intertemporal decision problem. Moreover, our main result shows 
that the social context has implications for intertemporal consumption decisions: Social 
preferences seem to outweigh individual problems of self-control when both preferences are 
elicited jointly (Chapter 3).  
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the effect of responsibility for another person who cannot 
actively take part in the decision process but silently bears the consequences of the decision 
maker’s choices on intertemporal decision-making. In our context, the decision maker does 
not know the time preferences of the dependent. Our results suggest that the decision maker 
cares for the preferences of the second person and integrates them into his utility function 
(Chapter 4).  
All three research projects that are part of this thesis study the importance of the 
described behavioral regularities for consumption decisions in various economic settings. The 
starting point for each research project is the assumption that economic decision-making in 
the respective environments might be altered by the existence of non-standard preferences. In 
each chapter of this thesis, the main research method to test for these assumptions and be able 
to observe economic decision-making in the different contexts is the implementation of a 
laboratory experiment.3 However, the studies differ in the nature of the behavioral anomalies 
that are investigated, the exact experimental setting that is applied to study the anomaly, and 
its application. Below, all studies are summarized by a brief overview of their research 
questions and main results. 
In the second chapter “Institution Formation in Public Goods Games with a 
Decentralized Self-Commitment Mechanism”, I explore behavioral impacts of self-
commitment possibilities for the provision of a public good. The introduction of sanctioning 
schemes is a widely used solution to enforce cooperation in social dilemma situations. 
However, enforcement problems remain a core difficulty for the employment of punishment 
devices in a public goods context. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the endogenous 
formation of a sanction institution by explicitly addressing potential enforcement problems. 
To do so, a self-sanctioning punishment scheme is introduced that relies on voluntary ex-ante 
deposit lodgments that give players the possibility to (pre-)commit to contribution. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The methodological foundation of behavioral economics is experimental economics (Loewenstein, 1999). Next 
to laboratory experiments also field experiments are an established method to study behavioral pattern (Harrison 
& List, 2004; Levitt & List, 2009). 
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workhorse is the three-stage non-cooperative game proposed by Kosfeld et al. (2009) who 
examine whether players would voluntary join an institution that exerts a punishment among 
its members. I modify the sanction mechanism of this game, such that the punishment is not 
executed by a centralized institution ex-post but players regulate their punishment ex-ante in a 
decentralized way. The experimental results show that the vast majority of players voluntarily 
pre-commit to contributions and the possibility of institution formation positively influences 
cooperation and group welfare. Even though the pre-commitment device is independent of 
group contributions, players repudiate free-riding behavior on the institution. Therefore, the 
results stress the importance of fairness considerations for the establishment and steadiness of 
institutions, which is in line with findings from the common pool resource literature (Baland 
& Platteau, 1996; McKean, 2000) and also in the context of public choice research (Buchanan 
& Congleton, 1998). 
Next to addressing possible enforcement problems with respect to public goods 
provision, this chapter tackles another problems recently discussed in the enforcement 
literature. Players can use the mechanism as a pre-commitment device to overcome self-
control problems. Recent studies analyze whether next to the tension between the individual 
rationality of self-interest and collective wellbeing, a social dilemma might also represent a 
self-control dilemma, which is defined as an interpersonal conflict between “better judgment“ 
and “temptation“ (Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984; Loewenstein, 1996, 2000).	  The 
provision of public goods may impose an internal conflict on the individual who has to trade 
off the objective of maintaining the better judgment to act pro-socially (cooperation) and the 
temptation to act selfishly (Kocher et al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 2012). A suggested solution 
to self-control problems is to offer people to bind their behavior (Strotz, 1956; Thaler & 
Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1992; Wertenbroch, 1998).4  So far, empirical studies on self-control 
strategies have found that people, when giving the opportunity, seem to use pre-commitment 
devices strategically in the anticipation of self-regulation failures (Wertenbroch, 1998; Trope 
& Fishbach, 2000; Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). Our experimental results are in line with 
these findings by suggesting that players bind their behavior ex-ante and use the deposit 
lodgments as a strategic device to overcome self-control problems. The underlying 
assumption, however, is that the social dilemma displays an individual self-control dilemma. 
Another possibility is that subjects simply prefer to introduce a sanction institution compared 
to a sanction-free environment in order to enforce discipline among the other players, which 
is also in line with previous findings in the literature that incorporates endogenous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Binding behavior is characterized by a strategic attempt to resist future temptations by voluntarily imposing 
(costly) constraints on future choices (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). 
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institutional choice into public good games (Gürerk et al., 2006; Tyran & Feld, 2006; Kosfeld 
et al., 2009).  
There are recent studies that analyze the correlation between public goods contribution 
and self-control problems and those studies report experimental evidence that impatient 
individuals contribute less to the public good than patient ones (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & 
Leibbrandt, 2011, Kocher et al., 2012) and that self-control is positively associated with 
cooperation (Martinsson et al., 2012). However, these studies measure the individual degree 
of self-control independently from the contribution decision in the public good game, where 
the choice tasks to elicit time preferences consist of lotteries that embrace payoffs that differ 
very much from those in the cooperation game. Most importantly, the typical choice task to 
elicit time preferences does not involve a second person. Rather, the decision maker’s choices 
only affect his own payoff and therefore his decisions are made in a socially detached 
environment. However, if social dilemmas represent a self-control conflict, any choice 
involves both a temporal as well as a social dimension. Other research fields show that 
behavior changes when individual preferences interact with social preferences, such as a shift 
towards more conservative risk behavior when decisions are made in a social context than 
when made individually (Song, 2008; Charness & Jackson, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2009) or 
less liability towards overconfidence (Sniezek & Henry, 1989; Plous, 1995). 
In the third chapter “Can´t Wait to be Nice: Self-Control and Cooperation in an 
Intertemporal Trust Game” we address this problem by analyzing the interlinkage of social 
and time preferences. The central research question is whether there is an interaction between 
intertemporal preferences and cooperative behavior, as suggested by the literature. We 
propose a new experimental design to study the interplay of intertemporal and social 
preferences based on joint elicitation. We modify a standard intertemporal choice task by 
replacing the lotteries with a regular trust game. We compare behavior in such intertemporal 
trust games to an intertemporal lottery task that does not have a social component. Our 
experimental results do not confirm that present-biased individuals cooperate less than time-
consistent ones. Rather, when both dimensions are elicited jointly, we find that individuals 
that display problems of self-control when only deciding for themselves, behave similar to 
time-consistent individuals in the intertemporal trust game. Hence, our results suggest that the 
social component outweighs the temporal aspect when both preferences interact. Moreover, 
we find some descriptive evidence that opens the question of how responsibility might 
influence intertemporal choices.  
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Chapter 4 “Responsibility Effects in Intertemporal Decision Making” addresses this 
question by studying the influence of responsibility on intertemporal decision-making. We 
offer a novel experimental setting, where we introduce responsibility into a standard 
intertemporal decision problem. The decision maker is a principal who determines both his 
own payoff as well as the payoff of a passive dependent who is not taking part in the decision 
problem but (silently) observes the principal’s behavior. We then compare behavior with the 
case where the same decisions only determine the payoff of the decision maker. Our results 
show that the decisions made with responsibility reflect more impatience. This finding is in 
contrast to predictions from the psychological literature but is consistent with a model, where 
the principal aggregates utility by a weighted utility function that is based on the principal’s 
estimation of the dependent’s time preferences if the principal is overconfident about his own 
degree of patience.  
Summing up, all three chapters confirm the importance of social preferences in human 
decision-making. Social preferences have an influence on collective action problems (public 
goods provision), as well as intertemporal decision-making. 
In the following chapters, each of the three studies is presented in more detail. Finally, 
the last chapter summarizes the main results of all three chapters and briefly discusses their 
implications. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Institution Formation in a Public Goods Game with a 
Decentralized Self-Commitment Mechanism 
 
Karen Heuermann* 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Social dilemma situations, i.e. the provision of public goods or common pool resources depict 
a very prominent example for market failures. In such dilemmas, individual interest collides 
with societal concerns and thus no socially optimal outcome emerges. A widely used solution 
is the introduction of a sanction mechanism that has the authority to punish individually 
deviant behavior. The literature that incorporates endogenous institutional choice into public 
good games agrees that subjects prefer to introduce a sanction institution compared to a 
sanction-free environment in order to enforce discipline among players (Tyran & Feld, 2006; 
Gürerk et al., 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009).5 More importantly, the option to form an institution 
positively affects efficiency (Walker et al., 2000; Tyran & Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; 
Sutter et al, 2010; Dal Bó et al. 2010).  
Kosfeld et al. (2009) introduce an “endogenous institution formation game” (p. 1338), 
where they examine whether players would voluntary join an institution that exerts a 
punishment mechanism among its members. To do so, the institution formation is modeled by 
a three-stage non-cooperative game. In the first stage, players can vote on participating in a 
costly organization that punishes each member for contributing less than his full endowment.6 
In the second stage, those who voted for participation learn the number of participants and 
then decide whether the organization shall be implemented, where a unanimous agreement is 
required. The third stage comprises the contribution decision. Since the authors focus on the 
formation process of the institution, they abstract from any enforcement problems by letting a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (through the Gottfried Wilhelm Leipnitz Price 
of the DFG, awarded to Axel Ockenfels) is gratefully acknowledged. 5	  An exception is the study of Bothelo et al. (2005) who find that an environment without punishment is widely 
preferred. However, ex-post, it can be argued that in their particular experimental setting an environment with 
punishment institution was less efficient than the VCM and this is a possible explanation for their result.	  
6 In contrast to the studies of Walker et al. (2000), Gürerk et al. (2006), Tyran & Feld (2006), Kroll et al. (2007) 
and Sutter et al. (2010), only members of the institution agree to be sanctioned, which increases the incentive for 
non-members to free ride. This is a “second-order free-rider problem” (cf. Oliver, 1980). Every player profits 
from the implementation of the institution but each player is best off when the others are members. Kosfeld et al. 
(2009) call this the “dilemma of endogenous institution formation” (p. 1336). 
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central authority impose the sanctions. They argue, however, that their setting captures 
characteristics of international agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol or the European Union 
Stability and Growth Pact. But especially when global public goods are considered, 
enforcement problems due to the absence of strong (centralized) institutions play a crucial 
role. Insights from experimental economics therefore stress the importance of decentralized 
punishment schemes, i.e. punishment executed by the players themselves, in order to 
antagonize free riding and maximize social welfare (Baland & Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990, 
1999; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Andreoni et al., 2003; Sefton et al., 2007).  
The aim of this study is to extent the framework of Kosfeld et al. (2009) by explicitly 
addressing potential enforcement problems. To do so, a modification of the three-stage non-
cooperative game of Kosfeld et al. (2009) is introduced, referred to as deposit-institution 
formation game. In stage 1, each player announces whether he accepts or rejects to lodge a 
deposit. Deposits are attached to a minimum contribution amount, such that they are not 
subtracted if the player contributes at least this amount but are lost in case of downward 
deviation. In the second stage, it is disclosed how many players are willing to lodge the 
deposit and then players bargain about its actual implementation (unanimous agreement). In 
the third stage, the public good game is played. Hence, the punishment mechanism used by 
Kosfeld et al. (2009) is changed; instead of letting the sanction mechanism be executed by a 
central authority ex-post, players are allowed to regulate their own punishment ex-ante in a 
decentralized way. Gerber and Wichardt (2009) theoretically analyze a two-stage mechanism, 
where deposits are lodged prior to the contribution stage, which are refunded in case of 
paying an exogenously given contribution level and lost in case of defection. The authors 
show that, if the deposit is sufficiently large, (full) contribution is a dominant strategy and 
therefore conclude that deposit lodgments might be a solution when strong sanction 
institutions are absent. 
When analyzed theoretically, the deposit-institution formation game comprises two 
types of subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A deposit equilibrium, where people voluntarily 
lodge the deposit and an institution is formed along the equilibrium path, and a status quo 
equilibrium, where no one lodges the deposit. Next to the decision whether to implement an 
institution or not, players need to coordinate on two behalves. First, they have to coordinate 
on the institution size. Second, they have to solve the problem of who is part of the institution. 
A possible solution can be offered to the coordination problem that concern the institution 
size by adding strictness as equilibrium condition in every subgame. When assuming standard 
preferences and strictness is an equilibrium refinement, there exists a unique strict subgame 
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perfect deposit equilibrium with respect to the size of the institution. In this equilibrium, 
exactly the minimum threshold of players, s*, that makes the implementation of an institution 
individually profitable, lodge the deposit and contribute to the public good; the other players 
free ride. Hence, if , there exist an equilibrium, where players freely pre-commit to 
cooperation. The reason is that even though players are best off when free-riding on the 
institution, players are still better off when the institution emerges compared to the status quo 
equilibrium, where public good contributions are zero.  
In order to test the theoretical predictions, an experiment was implemented. In four 
treatments, subjects played 20 rounds of the game described above. Since the focus is on 
possible enforcement problems, I vary the combination of deposit and minimum contribution 
amounts to manipulate the profitability of the institution. There are three main experimental 
results. First, the majority of players voluntarily pre-commits to (higher) contribution by 
lodging the deposit. Institutions are implemented in between 67.81 and 74.69 percent of the 
cases, even if lodging the deposit is not profitable from a payoff-maximization viewpoint. 
Moreover, players respond to incentives; more deposits are lodged in the two treatments, 
where institution formation is efficient. Second, the majority of implemented institutions 
consist of all players. Thus, I cannot confirm the equilibrium prediction of the standard model 
that expects the institution to consist of no one or no more than two players. However, it is in 
line with predictions based on social preferences; when analyzing the deposit-institution 
formation process while assuming that players suffer sufficiently from disadvantageous 
inequality aversion using the social preference model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), 
the grand institution with !∗ = ! becomes an equilibrium. The experimental data indicate that 
the predominance of grand institutions is not (only) driven by miscoordination but rather 
results from (almost) equilibrium play. Therefore, the results stress the importance of fairness 
considerations for the establishment and steadiness of institutions, which is in line with 
findings from the common pool resource literature (Baland & Platteau, 1996; McKean, 2000) 
and also in the context of public choice research (Buchanan & Congleton, 1998). Finally, 
contribution levels are increased and stable for members when an institution is implemented. 
Thus, the results suggest that by using ex-ante deposit lodgments as a decentralized sanction 
mechanism, players can resolve the second-order free-rider problem.  
The self-sanctioning scheme presented in this paper addresses three problems recently 
discussed in the enforcement literature. First, players can use the mechanism as a pre-
commitment device to overcome self-control problems. Recent studies analyze whether next 
to the tension between the individual rationality of self-interest and collective wellbeing, a 
s* > 0
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social dilemma might also represent a self-control dilemma.7 The provision of public goods 
may impose an internal conflict on the individual who has to trade off the objective of acting 
pro-socially (cooperate) and the temptation to act selfishly (Kocher et al., 2012; Martinsson et 
al., 2012). Experiments find a positive correlation between patience and contribution levels 
(Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011, Kocher et al., 2012) and that self-control is 
positively associated with cooperation (Martinsson et al., 2012). A suggested solution to self-
control problems is to offer people to bind their behavior8 (Strotz, 1956; Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981; Schelling, 1992; Wertenbroch, 1998). So far, empirical studies on self-control strategies 
have found that people seem to use pre-commitment devices strategically in the anticipation 
of self-regulation failures (Wertenbroch, 1998; Trope & Fishbach, 2000; Ariely & 
Wertenbroch, 2002).  
Second, the costs of sanctions are single-sided. Decentralized punishment mechanisms 
typically are costly and its usage therefore reduces the profits of both the punisher as well as 
the person that is punished. The increase in contributions to the public good thereby often 
does not compensate for the costs of sanctions, which in total results in lower (net) efficiency 
(Kroll et al., 2007; Nikiforakis & Normann, 2008; Egas & Riedl, 2008; Bothelo et al., 2005; 
Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Ostrom et al., 1992; Sefton et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008). Only 
when the mere threat of the punishment establishes cooperation and the punishment does not 
need to be executed anymore, efficiency increases (Sefton et al., 2007; Fehr & Gächter, 
2000). The self-sanctioning mechanism presented in this paper removes this problem. 
Third, the self-sanctioning scheme eliminates any possibility of counter-punishment. 
Most studies that analyze decentralized punishment have a common property: Those who 
punish other subjects are immune from any actions of reprisal.9 However, in practice, the 
opportunity to retaliate enacted punishment exists in almost every decentralized interaction. 
Hence, some of the more recent public good experiments allow for counter-punishment 
activities, i.e. subjects are informed about who has sanctioned them in the previous round and 
can then sanction their punishers. These studies find that the possibility of counter-
punishment has the potential to entirely outweigh the increase of contributions achieved by 
the punishment device in the first place and therefore renders it completely ineffective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  A self-control dilemma is defined as an interpersonal conflict between better judgment and temptation (Thaler 
& Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984; Loewenstein, 1996, 2000).	  
8 Binding behavior is characterized by a strategic attempt to resist future temptations by voluntarily imposing 
(costly) constraints on future choices (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). 
9 In some of the studies with partner matching, agents could punish all other group members by reducing their 
contribution amount or by randomly sanctioning other group members in subsequent rounds, but there could not 
be implemented an individually targeted sanction based on the prior sanction behavior. 
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(Denant-Boemont et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008). This fundamentally challenges the finding 
that (decentralized) punishment devices offer a solution to social dilemma situations. 
In section 2.2 the deposit-institution formation game is analyzed theoretically and 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria are deduced under the assumption of standard preferences. In 
section 2.3 the experiment is described and analyzed. Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
2.2 Endogenous Institutional Arrangement: Theory 
2.2.1 The General Model 
 
In line with Kosfeld et al. (2009), a symmetric n-player public goods game with ! ≥ 2 players 
is considered. Every player i has an initial endowment, ! > 0, of the private good and can 
contribute 0 ≤ !! ≤ ! to the public good. If player i contributes !! ∈    [0,!], ! = 1,… , !, the 
realized amount of the public good is ! = !!!!!! . Assuming (local) linearity in monetary 
payoffs, a player !’s payoff function then becomes: 
 Π! !! ,… , !! = ! − !! + ! !!!!!!                                                                 (2.1) 
 
 
The marginal per capita return (MPCR) from the investment into the public good is captured 
by the parameter !, with 0 < ! < 1 < !".10 Since the choice of participating in the institution 
is the choice between lodging the deposit or not, the following three-stage game is referred to 
as deposit-institution formation game. Notice that the three-stage game analyzed here has the 
same structure as the one in Kosfeld et al. (2009); the only modification is the different 
framing of the sanction mechanism. Then, the exact sequence of actions is as follows: 
 
Participation Stage: For a given minimum contribution level, 0 < !!"# ≤ ! , players 
simultaneously and independently can choose to lodge a deposit !, with 0 < ! ≤   !. Deposits 
are attached to a minimum contribution amount, such that they are lost in case contributions 
are below this threshold. Players who pronounce a willingness to lodge the deposit are called 
participants. The others are called non-participants.  
 
Implementation Stage: Participants learn how many players want to participate. All 
participants then simultaneously and independently vote on the implementation of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 With a < 1, !"(!!,…,!!)!!!   = -1 + a < 0 ∀  !. Thus, zero contribution, !!∗ = 0, is a strictly dominant strategy ∀i. Yet, 
since an > 1, !!!!(!!,…,!!)!!! = −1 + an  > 0 ∀  !. Thus, social optimality requires full contribution. 
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institution. For a successful implementation a unanimous agreement is required. If an 
institution is realized, participants become members and automatically lodge the deposit, 
whereas non-participants cannot become members and do not lodge the deposit. If no 
institution is implemented, no player lodges the deposit. 
 
Contribution Stage: The final stage comprises the contribution decision. If an institution is 
realized, members who contribute less than the minimum contribution amount loose the 
deposit. Non-members did not lodge a deposit and therefore do not obey any sanctioning 
mechanism. If no institution emerges, no one lodged a deposit and a standard public good 
game is played. 
 
Let S denote the set of members of the institution with size ! = !. First, consider the case of 
successful institution implementation and thus ! ≠ ∅. Then, a player’s final payoff Π! is: 
 ! − !! − !(!!) + ! !!!!!! 	      if ! ∈   !                        (2.2) 	  Π!   =                                    
 ! − !! + ! !!!!!!           if ! ∉ !                                        (2.3) 
 
                     
with 
                !                 if !! < !!"#             
           !(!!) = 
0                                       if !! ≥ !!"#                                (2.4)                   
 
If, however, no institution is implemented, i.e. if ! = ∅, then for all player !: 
 
           Π! =   ! − !! + ! !!!!!!                          (2.5) 
 
Equations (2.2) and (2.4) show how the self-sanctioning mechanism of the deposit institution 
works: members of the institution have to lodge a deposit, which is subtracted if players 
contribute less than the minimum contribution amount to the public good, i.e. for whom !! < !!"#. So, members are punished for contributing too little, whereas non-members do not 
obey any punishment device.  
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2.2.2 Standard Preferences 
 
The core question of the following analysis is whether players voluntarily implement a 
deposit institution and whether (full) contribution can be reached with this institutional 
setting. The underlying assumption for the analysis is common knowledge of rationality with 
perfect information. Each player therefore chooses his action in each stage by perfectly 
anticipating the outcomes of the game in all stages.11 Below, I will analyze the deposit-
institution formation game, and especially derive the set of subgame perfect equilibria if 
players’ preferences are given by U! = Π!. Since the three-stage game analyzed here has the 
same structure as the one in Kosfeld et al. (2009), it can be solved in the same way.  
In a subgame perfect equilibrium, each player decides on his action in every stage of 
the game based on backward induction. Hence, each subgame is considered separately, 
starting with the last stage (contribution stage). It is shown in Appendix 2.5.1 that, given that 
the players’ utility function can be characterized by U! = Π!, equations (2.2) and (2.4) entail 
that institution members’ dominant strategy in the subgame starting with the contribution 
stage is to contribute the minimum contribution amount once an institution is implemented if 
and only if ! > !!"# 1 − ! . For non-members it is optimal to contribute nothing. If no 
institution is implemented, zero contribution is the dominant strategy for all players. Thus, 
distinguishing between the cases that an institution is formed along the equilibrium path and 
when it is not implemented, we have the following Nash equilibria in each subgame that starts 
at stage 3: 
 
LEMMA 2.1: In stage 3, we have the following Nash equilibria in each subgame that starts in 
stage 3: (1) If S≠ ∅ and ! > !!"# 1 − ! , then !! =    !!"# for all ! ∈ ! and !! =   0 for all ! ∉ !, 
(2) If S= ∅, then !! = 0  for all !. 
 
Only if the loss of deviation (!) is larger than the gain (!!"# 1 − ! ), deviating is not 
beneficial for the player. This further depends on the MPCR of the public good. If ! is large, 
the benefit from the public good already provides the player with a higher incentive to 
contribute, and the required deposit amount can be smaller. Since 0 < ! < 1 and !!"# > 0, 
condition ! > !!"# 1 − !  is always satisfied for ! = !!"#. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Since the payoff functions of the players only depend on the number of participants (not who is participating) 
in the implementation stage and whether an institution is established (not who becomes a member) in the 
contribution stage, the assumption of perfect information can also be relaxed without changing the theoretical 
results. In this case, the notion of a subgame perfect equilibrium can be substituted with a sequential equilibrium. 
In the experiment described in the next section, players do not have perfect information.  
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Next, it is analyzed whether players are willing to join the deposit institution. Besides 
the free-rider problem, it might be payoff increasing for players to coordinate their 
contributions in the framework of the institution. Consider the implementation stage. In 
equilibrium, institution members earn ! − !!"# + !"!!"# and every player receives ! if no 
institution is implemented. Hence, joining an institution is beneficial if the institution size, !, 
is such that 
 
                                       !" > 1                                                                                                 (2.6)                     
 
Let !∗ be the lowest number of s such that condition (2.6) is satisfied. This threshold !∗ 
depicts the minimum number of participants needed to make the implementation of the 
institution individually profitable for participants. It follows that for (2.6) to hold ! has to be 
strictly larger than 1.12  
For convenience, any subgame perfect equilibrium, where people voluntarily lodge the 
deposit and hence an institution is implemented is called deposit equilibrium. If no one lodges 
the deposit, the equilibrium is referred to as status quo equilibrium. Then: 
 
PROPOSITION 2.1: When assuming standard preferences, a deposit equilibrium exists if any 
only if ! ≥ !∗  players participate. Moreover, also a status quo equilibrium exists for all 
participants, !, with 1 ≤ ! ≤ !. 
 
The proof is provided in Appendix 2.5.1. As is shown in Kosfeld et al. (2009), Proposition 2.1 
displays that an institution might emerge endogenously. The necessary condition for a 
successful implementation is that leastwise !∗ players participate. If this minimal threshold is 
met, there exists a deposit equilibrium for every ! ≥ !∗, where an institution of size ! is 
implemented. Note that the minimal threshold !∗ is not given exogenously but emerges from 
the players’ incentives to lodge the deposit. Yet, since also a status quo equilibrium exists, the 
implementation of the institution is not guaranteed.13 In addition, if !∗ < !, all institutions of 
size ! ∈ !∗, !∗ + 1,… , !  are a deposit equilibrium. As long as ! ≥ !∗, there also exist mixed 
strategy equilibria, where the probability of participation is positive and an institution is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  ! − !!"# + !"!!"# > !  ⇔ −!!"# + !"!!"# > 0  ⇔ !!"# !" − 1 > 0 . Since !!"# > 0 , the necessary 
condition for (2.6) to hold is that !" − 1 > 0 ⇔   !" > 1  ⇔ ! >    !!. Since a < 1, it is implied that ! >   1. The 
next non-negative integer satisfying this condition is !∗ ≥2. 
13 The provision of the institution, so the second-order public good, in equilibrium could be seen as a step-level 
mechanism with crucial threshold !∗.  However, the provision in this model differs from standard step-level 
public goods (i.e. Bagnoli & Lipman, 1989; Croson & Marks, 2000) since it is an equilibrium outcome.  
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implemented. Next to the decision whether to implement the institution or not, the players are 
also confronted to two coordination problems. First, they must coordinate how many players 
will lodge the deposit (the institution size). Second, players also need to coordinate on who 
will lodge the deposit and who stays out of the institution whenever ! < !. 
Consider stage 1 next. As discussed in Kosfeld et al. (2009), the first coordination 
problem of how many players will lodge the deposit can be addressed by introducing 
strictness as an equilibrium modification. A strict Nash equilibrium implies that the best 
response of each player is a unique strategy and hence any deviation from equilibrium play 
makes the player strictly worse off. Then, if the game has multiple stages, the condition for a 
strict subgame perfect equilibrium is that each subgame induces a strict Nash equilibrium. 
 
PROPOSITION 2.2: When assuming standard preferences, there exist a unique strict 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with exactly !∗ players being part of the institution.  
 
For the proof see Appendix 2.5.1. Proposition 2.2 says that strictness of equilibrium yields a 
unique deposit equilibrium. In this equilibrium, precisely the required threshold for the 
minimum number of players, !∗, form the institution and lodge the deposit. This makes 
intuitive sense. The crucial point is that every institution where the minimum threshold !∗ is 
met will be realized in the implementation stage because players’ material payoff is still 
higher as in the status quo equilibrium. Yet, since the setting depicts a second-order free-rider 
problem, each player is best off in material terms if the institution successfully emerges and 
its members contribute to the public good but he free rides on the institution and contributes 
nothing. Every additional member above the threshold !∗, i.e. ! − 1 ≥ !∗, therefore has the 
incentive to opt out of the institution knowing that the institution still emerges. Only if the 
minimum size of the institution, !∗, is met, the free riding option becomes unattractive since 
an institution of size !∗ − 1 will not be implemented. Unless !∗ = !, there are thus two groups 
of participants; players who voluntarily lodge the deposit and contribute to the public good 
and players who free ride and contribute nothing. 
Note that the unique deposit equilibrium of size !∗  depends on strictness as 
equilibrium refinement. However, as argued above, if this refinement is relaxed and weakly 
dominant strategies are considered as well, institutions of size larger than !∗ are also an 
equilibrium.14  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 If, for example, players’ expectations are such that an institution of size smaller than ! will be rejected in the 
implementation stage, each player’s best response is to participate in the institution. 
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2.3 Endogenous Institutional Arrangement: Experiment 
2.3.1 Procedural Details 
 
To reduce complexity, the deposit-institution formation game is slightly modified in the 
experiment. The participation and implementation stage are merged by letting participants 
condition their choice in the participation stage on a required minimum number of 
participants. If this number is met, players automatically join the institution. Everything else 
is the same as described above. The structure of the experiment is as follows.15  
At the beginning of each round, groups of four players are randomly matched and each 
player receives an endowment of 40 tokens (! = 4 and ! = 40). Each player then chooses to 
lodge the deposit or not, i.e. whether he wants to participate in the institution.16 Lodging a 
deposit is the willingness to agree that the deposit amount will be subtracted from the final 
payoff in case of non-compliance. Therefore, the deposit lodgment can be used as a pre-
commitment device to resist the future temptation of free-riding by voluntarily imposing a 
constraint (which is costly to overcome) on one´s future choices. By doing so, the subject can 
bind himself to cooperation, knowing that breaking this contract is costly (not its 
implementation). In a sense, it therefore can be seen as a “fictitious payment” since it is only 
payoff relevant in case of violation of the agreement. Consequently, the strategy space of 
members and non-members is held constant. The parameters are chosen such that no subject 
could make a negative net yield. 
If the player votes for lodging the deposit, he has to condition his choice on the 
minimum number of participants he requires (including himself) to actually join the 
institution (participation stage). Players whose minimum number of participating players is 
met automatically lodge the deposit without making another active decision (implementation 
stage). Nonparticipants do not make any decision about the minimum number they require. 
Finally, players simultaneously can freely choose the amount they want to contribute to the 
public good (contribution stage). After each round, every participant gets a detailed feedback 
about his round profit.  
There are four experimental treatments varying the degree of profitability of the 
institution. In all four treatments the MPCR of the public good is 0.65 (! = 0.65)17 and the 
minimum contribution amount is 40 tokens (!!"# = 40 ). Thus, when players want to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Experimental instructions are provided in Appendix 2.5.2. 
16 In the experimental instructions, the term “institution“ was not used. Instead, subjects were asked if they want 
to lodge the deposit or not, knowing the amount of the deposit and the minimum contribution amount. 
17 The parameter a=0.65 was chosen to reach an equilibrium institution size of !∗ = 2 in IF20 and IF40. The 
study of Grosse et al. (2011) shows that with a threshold of 3 out of 4, players seem to form the grand institution 
anyways. Therefore, a lower threshold can undermine this effect. 
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participate in the institution, they commit to contribute their full endowment. This parameter 
was chosen because a pilot study, where subjects could endogenously choose a combinations 
of the minimum contribution amount and the deposit level, showed that the vast majority 
suggested the efficient amount !!"# = ! . This implicates that subjects prefer the entire 
commitment of “all or nothing” in order to use the deposit lodgment as pre-commitment 
device. Institution formation is therefore at its highest costs, which renders participation very 
unattractive and increases the incentive to free-ride on the institution. On the other hand, in 
case of successful implementation, it can lead to the highest level of efficiency. It is possible 
that subjects may use the deposit mechanism as a signal for being a conditional cooperator to 
coordinate their behavior. To control for this, deposit lodgments in the baseline treatment IF0 
do not impose any material consequences and therefore can be used as mere communication 
device. The deposit amount differs among the other treatments: IF10 has a deposit of 10 
tokens, IF20 and IF40 have deposits of 20 and 40 tokens, respectively. In treatments IF0 and 
IF10, the implementation of an institution is not profitable since ! < !!"# 1 − ! . IF20 and 
IF40 lead to a profitable institution. In each treatment, the game consisted of 20 rounds. 
Since Kosfeld et al. (2009) focus on the formation process of the institution (not 
institutional enforcement), they merge the implementation and contribution stage in their 
experiment, such that – in case an organization emerges – members automatically transfer 
their full endowment to the public good. Moreover, treatments variation is based on varying 
the equilibrium institution size and the comparison to an environment where institution 
formation is not possible. Since in our setting, the focus is on whether the institution can be 
enforced, we vary the profitability of institutions rather than its size. Moreover, we do not 
bind players to any contribution amount but let them freely choose any contribution amount 
with 0 ≤ !! ≤ !. However, in line with Kosfeld et al. (2009), the institutional framework is 
such that members of the institution are punished for contributing less than the efficient 
amount. In contrast to Kosfeld et al. (2009), the institution does not impose any costs on its 
members. 
The experiments were run at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. The 
experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) was used. In total, 256 subjects recruited 
via the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004) participated in the experiment; 64 
subjects in each treatment. A stranger matching design is used to avoid any confounding 
reputational effects. To do so, constant groups of eight are formed, out of which groups of 
four players are randomly matched in each round. Therefore, there are 8 independent 
observations per treatment, yielding 32 independent observations in total. Each treatment 
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consisted of two sessions. Each session lasted about 60 minutes. On average, subjects earned 
10.63 Euro (about $13.50) in the experiment.  
 
2.3.2 Hypotheses 
 
The treatment variation is based on the profitability of the institution. Since ! < !!"# 1 − !  
in IF0 and IF10 and thus the threat of losing the deposit is not credible, a player who 
participates in the institution is always strictly better off contributing zero and losing the 
deposit than contributing the required amount of 40 tokens. Therefore, each member of the 
institution would always contribute nothing in the contribution stage. However, since ! > !!"# 1 − !  in IF20 and IF40, the threat of losing the deposit is large enough to make 
members better off contributing 40 tokens, whereas non-members free-ride. Thus, we can 
deduce the following hypotheses for the contribution stage: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.1(a): Everyone free-rides (i.e. !! = 0  ∀  ! ) in IF0 and IF10. Since ! <!!"#(1 − !), every member of the institution is better off contributing zero instead of !!"# and 
thus every member loses the deposit in IF0 and IF10 if an institution is implemented. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.1(b): Members of the institution contribute the minimum contribution 
amount (i.e. !! = 40 ∀  !   ∈ !) and non-members free-ride (i.e. !! = 0 ∀  !   ∉ !) in IF20 and 
IF40. Since ! > !!"#(1 − !), every institution members’ dominant strategy is to contribute !!!" and thus no member loses the deposit in IF20 and IF40. 
 
Knowing that all members of the institution will contribute 0 in the contribution stage in IF10, 
each player is always better off not implementing an institution and thus the only rational 
equilibrium in IF10 is !∗ = 0. Using backward induction, no player should therefore initiate 
an institution. Note, no hypothesis can be inferred for players’ behavior in the implementation 
stage in treatment IF0 because players are indifferent between joining the institution or not. 
Since ! = 0.65, treatments IF20 and IF40 are designed such that !∗ = 2. Therefore the 
following hypotheses for the implementation stage can be assumed:  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.2(a): No institutions are implemented (i.e. ! = !∗ = 0) in IF10. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.2(b): The institution consists of two players (i.e. ! = !∗ = 2) in IF20 and 
IF40. 
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Naturally, the former hypotheses imply a hypothesis about the impact on net efficiency. Net 
efficiency is the percentage of potential maximal earnings reached by the group in each 
round. Since there are no deposits paid in IF0 and IF10 and everyone contributes 0 in 
equilibrium, average net efficiency is predicted to lay around 40 percent in IF0 and IF10.18 
Since in IF20 and IF40, two out of four players in each group lodge the deposit and contribute 
their full endowment and no deposits are lost, average net efficiency lays around 70 percent.19 
Hence, net efficiency in the profitable treatments is higher compared to the unprofitable ones: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.3(a): Net efficiency in IF0 and IF10 is the same as predicted by a standard 
public good game and lies around 40 percent of the welfare maximum. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2.3(b): Net efficiency in IF20 and IF40 lays around 70 percent of the welfare 
maximum. Hence, net efficiency increases if the institution formation is profitable.  
 
2.3.3 Results 
 
The result section is structured as follows. First, contribution behavior is scrutinized under the 
premise of implementation rates of institutions. Then, by incorporating the credibility (and 
thus profitability) of institutions, it is differentiated between members’ and non-members’ 
behavior. Finally, the impact on net efficiency is analyzed.  
 The first result shows that contribution levels are higher and remain stable if 
institution formation is profitable. 
 
RESULT 2.1: Overall, the average contribution levels are higher in treatments IF20 and 
IF40, where institution formation is profitable compared to treatments IF0 and IF10, where 
the institutions do not impose a credible threat. Moreover, contribution levels are stable in 
IF20 and IF40 but decreasing in IF0 and IF10. 
 
Table 2.1 summarizes the average contributions per treatment. Average contributions are 
around 20 tokens in IF0, 24 tokens in IF10, 31 tokens in IF20 and 30 tokens in IF40. Average 
contributions are not statistically different between IF0 and IF10 (Mann-Whitney test, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 !∗ !"!!!!.!"∗!∗!!∗ !"!!"!!.!"∗!∗!" = 38.46% in IF0 and IF10. Note, the hypothesis about net efficiency is not different to 
predictions in a standard public good game without the possibility of institution formation.  
19 [!∗ !"!!"!!.!"∗!∗!" !!∗ !"!!!!.!"∗!∗!" ]!∗ !"!!"!!.!"∗!∗!" = 69.23 % in IF20 and IF40. 
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p=0.0587)20 and also not between IF20 and IF40 (Mann-Whitney test, p= 0.8336). However, 
contributions are significantly higher in treatment IF20 compared to treatments IF0 and IF10 
(Mann-Whitney test, IF0 vs. IF20: p=0.0008; IF10 vs. IF20, p=0.0274) and in treatment IF40 
compared to IF0 (IF0 vs. IF40, p=0.0016). However, when comparing IF10 to IF40, the 
difference fails to be significant (IF10 vs. IF40, p=0.0587). Moreover, Figure 2.1 shows that 
contribution levels are constant in IF20 and IF40 but decreasing in IF0 and IF10. The 
decrease of average contributions over time is highly significant in IF0 and IF10 (Spearman 
rank order correlation; IF0: ρ=	  −0.3053, p=0.0000; IF10: ρ=	  −0.1599, p=0.0000) but there is 
no sigificant change in treatments IF20 and IF40 (IF20: ρ=	   0.0482, p= 0.0848; IF40: ρ=	  
0.0052,  p=0.8524).  
 
TABLE 2.1: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS 	  	   	   	   	   	   	   Treatment 
 	   	              IF0           IF10         IF0 & IF10            IF20          IF40         IF20 & IF40 	  
Average contributions 
 Total        19.12          23.85             21.68                30.87         30.16             30.52 
 Members       29.88          32.84             31.22                37.97         39.01             38.48 
Non-members            12.23           9.61             11.21                15.87         13.49              14.63 
 
No institution       12.08           8.99             10.91                15.49         12.39              13.86 	  
 
FIGURE 2.1: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS PER TREATMENT 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The statistical tests build on group averages per independent observation. Throughout the whole paper, results 
that are reported are based on two-sided tests. 
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Next, the implementation rate of institutions is analyzed. The following result shows that in 
all treatments, an institution is always initiated, and implemented in between 68 and 75 
percent of the cases.  
 
RESULT 2.2: In all three treatments, in each round an institution is always initiated  and the 
institution is implemented in 68, 75, and 72 percent of the cases in treatments IF10, IF20, and 
IF40, respectively.  
 
Table 2.2 depicts the absolute and relative numbers of initiated and implemented institutions 
and the corresponding institution sizes per treatment. In IF10, fewer institutions are 
implemented than in IF20 and IF40 (217 versus 239 and 230, respectively) and this difference 
is significant (Mann-Whitney test, IF10 vs. IF20, p=0.0005; IF10 vs. IF40, p=0.0365) but the 
implementation rate does not differ between IF20 and IF40 (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.1668). 
The high participation rate shows that players seem to highly value the possibility of a pre-
commitment device to establish cooperation. More importantly, they successfully implement 
institutions and thus resolve the second-order free-rider problem. 
 
TABLE 2.2: IMPLEMENTED INSTITUTIONS 	  
                                               Treatment 
 
                        IF10                     IF20                     IF40 	  
                        Nr.                %                 Nr.              %                  Nr.               % 
      Initiated Institutions               320     100.00            320          100.00           320          100.00 
      Implemented institutions 
Total                         217                67.81             239             74.69           230            71.88 
1 member                           15                  6.91     10               4.18             12              5.22 
2 members                             7                  3.23     7               2.93               8              3.48 
3 members                                     22                10.14               43             17.99             32            13.91 
4 members                     173                79.72             179             74.90           178            77.39 	  
Notes: An institution is initiated if at least one player per group votes for the deposit lodgment. Percentages are 
computed in the following way: Initiated institutions in relation to all rounds, implemented institutions over all 
initiated institutions, institutions size over all implemented institutions. 
 
In the following, the size of implemented institutions is analyzed: 
 
RESULT 2.3: In all treatments, the majority of implemented institutions consist of all players, 
i.e. ! = 4. Institutions smaller than !∗, i.e. ! < !∗, are very rarely observed.  
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As can be seen in Table 2.2 (lower part), in all three treatments, the majority of implemented 
institutions consists of all four players (IF10: 79.72 percent, IF20: 74.90 percent, IF40: 77.39 
percent). On average, the size of implemented institutions does not differ between treatments 
(Mann-Whitney test, IF10 vs. IF20, p=0.2922; IF10 vs. IF40, p=0.5992; IF20 vs. IF40, 
p=1.000). Moreover, institutions are almost never implemented with fewer than s∗ players. 
Overall, only 4.18 (5.22) percent of implemented institutions consist of less than s∗ players in 
IF20 (IF40). Hence, the theoretical threshold s∗ is not a good estimation of the maximum 
institution size (cf. Proposition 2.2) but rather predicts its minimum size. This finding 
confirms the findings of Kosfeld et al. (2009). Since in the majority of the cases (67.81%) an 
institution is implemented in IF10, i.e. s > 0, Hypothesis 2.2(a) can be rejected. Moreover, in 
92.11% of the cases, institutions consist of more than two players in IF20 and IF40 and 
therefore Hypothesis 2.2(b) can be rejected as well. 
 Next, the question why there are so many grand institutions can be addressed. There 
are two possible reasons. Either, players target to implement institutions of size s∗  but 
miscoordinate in the participation stage. Another possibility is that players aim to implement 
the grand institution and reject institutions of less than four players in the implementation 
stage. Analyzing the required minimum number of participants may shed some light on the 
motivation behind subjects’ behavior: 
 
RESULT 2.4: The vast majority of players require more than two players to participate in the 
institution. This implies, that institutions with size smaller or equal to two have a high 
likelihood of failing to be implemented in the implementation stage. 
 
Support for Result 2.4 is presented in Table 2.3. If the motivation for the high participation 
rate was that players miscoordinate, the required minimum number of participant should be !!"# = s∗ = 2 in treatments IF20 and IF40. However, only 13.74 (18.96) percent require this 
minimum number of participants in IF20 (IF40). The likelihood that an institution of s < s∗ is 
implemented lies below 7 (5) percent in IF20 (IF40). When the threshold s∗ is met, the 
likelihood increases but still is very low. The result that roughly one third to one half of 
players require !!"# = 3 might be an indicator that the predominance of grand institutions 
emerges because ! = 4 depicts a focal point in the coordination problem. However, a non-
trivial fraction of players reject institutions of size s∗ < ! < !. Moreover, players seem to 
learn the benefit of establishing the grand institution in the course of the experiment and adapt 
their required minimum number of participants over time. In all three treatments, the required 
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minimum number of participants increases significantly over time (Spearman rank order 
correlation, IF10: ρ=0.0722, p=0.0098; IF20: ρ=0.0745, p=0.0077; IF40: ρ=0.1121, 
p=0.0001). Hence, the data suggest that grand institutions are not solely formed because of 
focal points. Rather, a possible explanation seem to be that the driving force behind subject’s 
behavior might be additional influences, such as equality and fairness considerations.21 
 
TABLE 2.3: REQUIRED MINIMUM NUMBER OF PLAYERS  	  
                 	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Treatment 
 	   	              IF10                 IF20                IF40  	  
                             Nr.                %                 Nr.              %                    Nr.             % 
Required Minimum Number 
1 member                               56              5.20               50              4.52         74          6.65      
2 members                         189            17.57             152          13.74        211        18.96          
3 members                         360             33.46              541            48.92                 465        41.78           
4 members                               471             43.77              363            32.82        363        32.61         	  
Note: Table 2.3 depicts the absolute and relative number of the minimum number required by participants over 
all rounds. The relative number is the frequency the required minimum number is chosen relative to all choices 
made by participants. 
 
So far, it has been shown that there are significantly less institutions in treatment IF10. The 
next question to address is the credibility of the institution, which is the core difference 
between the treatments. The second part of Hypothesis 2.1(a) says that if an institution is 
implemented, every member is better off losing the deposit in IF0 and IF10 since the 
institution is not credible. In treatment IF20 and IF40, however, the threat of losing the 
deposit should be high enough to make members stick to the agreement (second part of 
Hypothesis 2.1(b)). Thus, it has to be analyzed how many members violate the agreement and 
thus get punished for doing so: 
 
RESULT 2.5: Deposit losing rates are much higher in IF0 and IF10 than in IF20 and IF40. 
Moreover, over time, more people lose their deposit in IF0 and IF10 but the rate remains 
constant in IF20 and IF40. 
 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the absolute number of all individually lodged deposits over all rounds 
and how many of these lodgments have been lost per treatment. Clearly, the second part of 
Hypothesis 2.1(a) cannot be rejected. Deposit losing rates are much higher in IF0 (32.80 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The high implementation rate of grand institutions could also be due to expectations about the required 
minimum number of the other players.  
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percent) and IF10 (20.25 percent) than in IF20 (6.67 percent) and IF40 (4.07 percent) and the 
difference between IF0 and IF20 and IF40, as well as between IF10 and IF20 and IF40 is 
strongly significant (Mann-Whitney test, IF0 vs. IF20, p=0.000; IF0 vs. IF40, p=0.000; IF10 
vs. IF20, p=0.000; IF10 vs. IF40, p=0.000). Since lost deposit rates are minimal in treatments 
IF20 and IF40, also the second part of Hypothesis 2.1(b) cannot be rejected. Furthermore, lost 
deposit rates increase significantly over time in IF10 (Spearman rank order correlation, ρ=	  
0.1828, p=0.0000) but do not change in IF20 and IF40, respectively (IF20: ρ=	   -­‐0.0307; 
p=0.3655; IF40: ρ=	  0.0149, p=0.6673). Thus, players respond to incentives: fewer institutions 
are implemented in IF10 but additionally the institution is less binding.  
 
FIGURE 2.2: DEPOSIT LOSING RATES 
 
Note: The relative numbers are calculated as follows: Percentage of deposits that have 
been subtracted relative to all deposit lodgements over all rounds. 
 
If we now compare the contributions of members and non-members, the following result can 
be derived. 
 
RESULT 2.6: In all treatments, members contribute on average more than twice as much as 
non-members. Contributions between non-members do not differ between treatments, but 
average contribution levels of members are higher in the two profitable treatments than in 
IF10. Moreover, contribution levels of members as well as non-members decrease over time 
in IF10 but remain constant for members in IF20 and IF40. 
 
Evidence is presented in Table 2.1 (lower part). The difference in contributions of members 
and non-members is strongly significant in all treatments (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, IF10, 
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IF20, IF40: p=0.0117).22 However, Table 2.1 also shows that members contribute on average 
less in IF10 than in IF20 and IF40 and this difference is significant as well (Mann-Whitney 
test, IF10 vs. IF20: p=0.0163; IF10 vs. IF40: p=0.0090). The difference between contributions 
of non-members, however, is not significant (Mann-Whitney test, IF10 vs IF20: p=0.2752; 
IF10 vs IF40: p=0.1266; IF20 vs IF40: p=0.0495). Intuitively, these findings make sense since 
the institution is less binding for members in IF10 than in IF20 and IF40. Since on average 
members and non-members contribute more than 0 in IF10, i.e. c! > 0 ∀  i, the first part of 
Hypothesis 2.1(a) can be rejected. This is not surprising, since public good experiments show 
that players tend to contribute more than predicted by the selfish free-riding equilibrium (for 
surveys, see i.e. Ledyard, 1995; Zelmer, 2003; Gächter, 2007; Chaudhuri, 2011). The first 
part of Hypothesis 2.1(b) cannot be rejected. Even though players contribute on average more 
than 0 if no institution is implemented or they are not members (i.e. if S ≠ ∅, c! > 0 ∀  i   ∉ S 
and if S = ∅, c! > 0 ∀  i), members contribute on average almost 40 tokens, i.e. c! = 40 ∀  i   ∈ S. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 2.3, both contributions of members as well as 
non-members decrease over time in IF10 and this decrease is highly significant (Spearman 
rank order correlation, members: ρ=−0.3323, p=0.000; non-members: ρ=−0.3972, p=0.000), 
which is an explanation for the overall decrease in contributions. In IF20 and IF40, on the 
other hand, contributions of members are constant (Spearman rank order correlation, IF20: 
ρ=0.0645; p=0.0572; IF40: ρ=0.0461; p=0.1832), whereas contributions of non-members 
decrease significantly as well (IF20: ρ=−0.3752, p=0.000; IF40: ρ=−0.3285, p=0.000).  
 
FIGURE 2.3: AVERAGE CONTRIBUTIONS MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 This result is very strong. In all four treatments, there is not a single case, where, on average, non-members 
have contributed more than members in any round. Therefore, the ranking is the same in all treatments.  
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Finally, net efficiency is scrutinized. Net efficiency is the average realized group earnings 
relative to the highest potential group earnings in each round. So, I define net efficiency as Π!"#$%&"'/Π!"#, with Π!"#$%&"' depicting for the average realized group earnings, and Π!"! 
the potential maximal group earnings. Maximal group earnings are attained when each group 
member contributes his whole endowment to the public good. As can be seen in Table 2.3, net 
efficiency levels are higher in IF20 (85.09%) and IF40 (83.84%) than in IF0 (67.88%) and 
IF10 (73.97%). This difference is significant (Mann-Whitney test, IF0 vs IF20: p=0.0000; IF0 
vs IF40: p=0.0000; IF10 vs IF20: p=0.0000; IF10 vs IF40: p=0.004). Moreover, net efficiency 
levels of groups where an institution is implemented are higher than if no institution is 
implemented in all treatments and this difference is also strongly significant (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p=0.0117 in all treatments). Another interesting question is whether the level 
of efficiency that is achieved when an institution is implemented differs between IF10 and 
IF20 and IF40. This is indeed the case; average net efficiency with an institution is 
significantly lower in IF10 (Mann-Whitney test, IF10 vs. IF20: p=0.0015; IF10 vs. IF40: 
p=0.0005). Finally, net efficiency levels decrease significantly over time in IF0 and IF10 
(Spearman rank order correlation, IF0: ρ=−0.3053, p=0.0000; IF10: ρ=−0.1812, p=0.0000) 
and thus follow the usual pattern of public good games.  Thus, Hypothesis 2.3(a) cannot be 
rejected. Net efficiency levels over rounds are constant in IF20 and IF40 (IF20: ρ=0.0403, 
p=0.1497; IF40: ρ=-0.0053, p=0.8484). Since net efficiency levels are significantly higher in 
IF20 and IF40 compared to the other treatments and constant over time, it can be said that 
Hypothesis 2.3(b) cannot be rejected as well.  
TABLE 2.4: NET EFFICIENCY WITH/ WITHOUT INSTITUTIONS PER TREATMENT  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Treatment 
 	   	            IF0             IF10  IF20        IF40  
 	  
  Average Level of  
  Net Efficiency 
 Total      67.88          73.97             85.09    83.84 
 Institution     80.01          84.25             92.81    94.14 
 No institution     57.04          52.29             62.29    57.52 
 	  
 
2.3.4 Possible Explanation: Social Preferences 
 
Result 2.3 has shown that in the majority of the cases, a grand institution, where all players 
lodge the deposit, emerges. Moreover, the fact that many players require all four players to 
participate as condition for their own participation indicates that many players reject 
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institutions of size smaller than n. Yet, as shown above, standard theory assumes that such 
rejections are dominated whenever s∗ ≤ ! < !. Hence, the experimental results indicate that 
the realization of grand institutions might be influenced by preferences for equality and 
fairness. To address this possible explanation, it is analyzed how social preferences might 
influence the institution formation process, adopting the same framework as in Kosfeld et al. 
(2009). To do so, the inequity-aversion model proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) is used.23 
For the analysis the set of all players is divided into non-members, denoted by j (with !!, !!, ! ∉ !), and members, denoted by k (with !!, !! , ! ∈ !) since players who are not in the 
institution and those who are in the institution impose different levels of disutility from (either 
advantageous or disadvantageous) inequality on player !. The utility function for all ! ∈ ! 
becomes 
 !! = ! − !! − ! + ! !! + ! !! + !!!!∉!!∈!\{!} − !! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!                  −!! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!! −!! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!! − !! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!      (2.7)      
 
and the utility function for all ! ∉   ! is 
 !! = ! − !! + ! !! + ! !! + !!!!∉!\{!}!∈! − !! !! max !! − !! , 0!!!!                                    (2.8) −  !! !!!!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!!! −!! !! max !! − !! , 0!!!! −   !! !!!!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!!!       
 
The parameter !! measures player i´s disadvantageous inequality aversion and !! the utility 
loss caused by advantageous inequality. In line with Fehr and Schmidt (1999), it is assumed 
that !! ≤ !! and 0 ≤ !! < 1 for all !. Moreover, following the assumption that players suffer 
most from disadvantageous inequality, it is assumed that !! < 1 − ! for all !. 
Again, the contribution stage is considered first.  
  
LEMMA 2.2: In stage 3, we have the following Nash equilibria in each subgame that starts in 
stage 3: If S≠ ∅ and ! > !!"#(1 − !), then (1) !! =    !!"# for all ! ∈ ! and !! =   0 for all ! ∉ ! if !! < (1 − !) for all  ! ∉ !, (2)) If S= ∅ and !! < 1 − ! ∀!, then !! = 0  for all i. 
 
The proof is provided in Appendix 2.5.1. As under the assumption of standard preferences, 
members always contribute the minimum contribution amount if the institution is credible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Other models of social preferences could have been considered as well (i.e. Rabin, 1993; Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Cox et al., 2007).  
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Non-members free-ride if their disutility from advantageous inequality is rather small, i.e. if !! < !! (1 − !) . If no institution is implemented, c! = 0  ∀!  is a Nash equilibrium. 24  It is 
interesting to analyze whether an equilibrium with !! = !!"# ∀! exists without an institution if 
all players have social preferences with !! < 1 − !. However, no equilibrium with !! = !!"# ∀! 
exists without an institution.25  
Consider the implementation stage next. If β! < (1 − !) and an institution of size s is 
implemented, institution member !’s utility is given by ! − !!"# + !"!!"# − !!!!! (! − !)!!"# 
and everyone’s payoff is !  if no institution is implemented. Players are thus better off 
entering into an institution if the number of members, !, satisfies  
 
                       !" − !! > 1                                                      (2.9) 
  
The formula is the same as in the standard preferences case but some disutility from 
inequality between members and non-members is subtracted. When comparing equations 
(2.6) and (2.9), it is obvious that the threshold !∗∗ to satisfy condition (2.9) has to be larger 
than !∗.26 For the case of identical !!’s (!!=  !  ∀!), the same analysis as implemented in the 
former section can be applied based on the new threshold !∗∗  defined by equation (2.9). 
Obviously, for sufficiently strong social preferences, !∗∗ = !  is the unique deposit 
equilibrium, where standard preferences forecasts various deposit equilibria with !∗ ≤ ! − 1. 
Thus, social preferences might be an explanation for the majority of grand institutions 
observed in the experiment. 
 
2.4 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
In the framework of this study, the institution formation process suggested by Kosfeld et al. 
(2009) is extended by the integration of a non-centralized solution based on a conditional ex-
ante self-sanctioning scheme. Players were given the opportunity to lodge a deposit that is lost 
in case of deviation. Despite the fact that the setting comprises a second-order free-rider 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Let !!! be any arbitrary profile for all possible contributions for all players except i. If S= ∅, a player i will 
contribute an amount !! > 0 to the public good, if and only if !! !! , !!! >   !! 0, !!!  ∀!! > 0,∀  !!! , ∀!, which 
means ! − !! + ! !!! + !!! − !! !! − !! − !!(!! − !!) > ! + ! !!! − !!!!. If the other players contribute 
nothing, no player i has an incentive to contribute to the public good, because !! !! , 0 < !! 0,0 ,∀!! > 0,∀!. If 
the other players contribute to the public good, still every player has an incentive to not contribute, because !! !! , !!! < !! 0, !!! , ∀!! > !!! > 0,∀!!! > !! > 0,∀!.	  
25 ! − !!"# + ! !!"#! + !!!"# > ! + ! !!"#! − !!!!"#⟺ ! − 1 > −!!⟺ !! ≯ 1 − !. 
26 The condition for standard preferences is ! >    !!. Here, the condition becomes ! >    !!∝!! . Since ∝!≥ 0 and 0 < ! < 1, the threshold increases. 
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problem, the theory suggests that players principally can resolve this problem. If the 
institution is profitable, i.e. the deposit is large enough to depict a credible threat, there exists 
a set of subgame perfect Nash equilibria, where ! players (!∗ ≤ ! ≤ !) lodge the deposit. 
However, also a status quo equilibrium exists and thus, success is not guaranteed. 
The empirical part of the paper shows that the mechanism of deposit lodgments 
successfully increases contributions and can enforce cooperation among its members. A 
possible explanation might be that voting is used as a signal for being a conditional 
cooperator (Tyran & Feld, 2006), which has been shown to already promote cooperation 
(Brosig et al., 2003). To control for this, a baseline treatment IF0 is implemented that does not 
impose any payoff consequences on the players and thus can be used as mere communication 
(cheap talk) tool. A general observation in standard public good experiments (without the 
possibility of any kind of coordination) are contribution levels between 40 and 60 percent in 
the first round and then a steady decline to 5 to 20 percent in the last round (i.e. Falkinger et 
al., 2000; Ostrom, 2000). Average contributions are not higher in IF0. Hence, it does not seem 
that the increase in contributions is (solely) driven by the use of the sanction mechanism as a 
coordination device. Moreover, the results imply that players voluntarily prefer an 
environment with the pre-commitment mechanism to a sanction-free environment: In all 
treatments, in the vast majority of the cases, institutions are implemented. Third, the vast 
majority of implemented institutions are grand institutions. This result shows that fairness 
considerations are important for the formation and stability of institutions. It also is in line 
with the generality principle suggested by Buchanan & Congleton (1998), which requires 
nondiscrimination of political choices and equality in behavior towards all individuals. Forth, 
when an institution is implemented, groups reach efficiency levels close to the possible 
maximum level in treatment IF20 and IF40. Due to the higher deposit losing rates in IF10, 
efficiency levels are lower. Still, the difference between net efficiency levels when an 
institution emerges compared to an institution-free environment is significant in all 
treatments. One possible reason could be that subjects that are more cooperative also are more 
likely to (self-)select into more efficient institutions. However, in a comparable setting, Sutter 
et al. (2010) find “support against the conjecture that self-selection is an important driving 
force behind the positive effects of endogenous institutional choice” (p. 1561).  
The main differences to the experimental design of Kosfeld et al. (2009) are as 
follows.27 First, since the authors focus on the formation of institutions, they abstract from 
any potential enforcement problems and therefore – in case an institution emerges  – members 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 The decision trees of both experiments are provided in Appendix 2.5.3. 
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automatically have to transfer their full endowment to the public good account. Second, 
players get information about the exact number of participants. Moreover, a partner matching 
is used. With this setting, expectation formation about others’ willingness to form an 
institution is very easy. The analysis of elicited beliefs in Kosfeld et al. (2009) shows that the 
majority of players expect all other players to participate in the institution, which implies that 
– if expectations are right – each player’s best response then is to participate in the institution 
as well. Hence, players can easily coordinate on the grand institutional equilibrium.28 In this 
study, players only learn whether their required minimum number of participants is met not 
the exact number of participants. Moreover, a stranger matching is used. As argued in the 
theoretical part of this paper, any institution of size larger than !∗ is an equilibrium if weakly 
dominant strategies are considered. Players might coordinate on the grand institution, if they 
know or expect that players require all subjects to participate in order to implement the 
institution (and thus all players require !!"# = 4). However, with strictness as equilibrium 
refinement, this requirement is always dominated (cf. Proposition 2.2). Clearly, in the 
laboratory, data are more noisy. Yet, the experimental design chosen in this study reduces the 
possibility to coordinate on the grand institution by making expectation formation more 
difficult. 
Clearly, a direct comparison to the results of Kosfeld et al. (2009) is not possible due 
to the differences in the experimental design of both studies. However, there is one point to 
mention. In this study, besides the fact that learning is more difficult than in a partner 
matching, there still is a significant increase in the grand institution. Moreover, on net, the 
possibility of institution formation is equally successful in both studies; cooperation rates in 
the two profitable treatments (IF20 and IF40) of this study are very similar (and even slightly 
higher) to those of the corresponding treatment (IF65) of Kosfeld et al. (2009).29  
Hence, there are three main contributions of this study. First, the institution formation 
game proposed by Kosfeld et al. (2009) can also be applied to a decentralized sanction 
mechanism. The conclusion of the authors that “institution formation can be an important and 
effective solution in social dilemma situations” (p. 1353) can be supported. Second, a novel 
institutional setting is presented. The experimental setting contributes to the literature by 
combining the endogenous formation of institutions in a public good game with a pre-
commitment mechanism; thus it can contribute to the understanding of endogenous 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 If players expect (or even know) that institutions of size smaller than 4 will be rejected, each players’ best 
response is to participate in the institution as well since the individual payoff of each player when all four 
players contribute to the PG is larger than the status quo equilibrium where no PG is realized.  
29 Data can only be compared to the treatments with the same MPCR (a=0.65). 
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institutional choice. Third, the self-sanctioning mechanism has one important advantage: The 
single-sidedness of punishment costs. When comparing net efficiency of IF0 (costless 
punishment) and IF20 and IF40 (costly one-sided punishment), it can be seen that the costs 
accompanied by the deposit device do not outweigh the gain in profits reached by the higher 
cooperation level. Even though the use of the sanction mechanism is very high, efficiency 
increases as well. Next, net efficiency levels reached in this study are higher compared to 
those found in studies using a decentralized ex-post punishment mechanisms. Typical net 
efficiency levels lay between 70 percent (Nikiforakis, 2008; Sefton et al., 2007) and 80 
percent (Fehr & Gächter, 2000a; Kroll et al., 2007). Net efficiency levels achieved in the two 
profitable treatments with the sanction institution in this study lay around 93 percent. Besides 
the positive impact on efficiency levels compared to a costly ex-post punishment device, the 
self-sanctioning scheme moreover removes any possibility of revengeful action and thus 
eliminates the problem of counter-punishment.  
Furthermore, the mechanism can help players to overcome a self-control problem that 
might be present in their decision whether to contribute to the public good or not. The results 
depict a participation rate of 100 percent, which means that in every single round, there is 
always at least one player who wants to lodge the deposit. Seeing the deposit lodgment as a 
pre-commitment device, the experimental results therefore suggest that players seem to value 
the possibility to bind their behavior ex-ante and use the deposit lodgments as a strategic 
device to overcome self-control problems in the anticipation of self-regulatory failure. 
However, only around 5 percent of players require a minimum number of participants of one 
person (themselves). This is an indicator that the high participation rate might not be caused 
by the motivation to castigate one’s own self-control problems but rather that the mechanism 
is used to enforce discipline among the other players. However, the study cannot explicitly 
disentangle this motivation. This remains an interesting question for future research.  
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2.5 Appendix 
  
2.5.1 Proof of Lemmas and Propositions 
 
Proof of Lemma 2.1. In a subgame perfect equilibrium, it is assumed that each player 
rationally anticipates the equilibrium outcomes of future stages by applying backward 
induction. Following this line of reasoning, each player considers stage 3, the contribution 
stage, first. 
 
Case (1): If !	  is a member of the institution, i.e. ! ∈   !: 
 
In stage 3, all members of the institution have lodged the deposit ! and then have to decide 
about their contribution amount. They can contribute any amount !! with 0 ≤ !! ≤ ! and face 
the following payoffs: 
 
For all ! ∈   !: 
 ! − !! + ! !!!∈!\{!} + !!    if !! ≥ !!"#     and                        
 !! =  
                         ! − !! − ! + !( !!!∈!\{!} + !!)  if !! < !!"# 
 
 
Now let !!! be any arbitrary profile for all possible contributions for all players except i. If 0 ≤ !! < !!"#, a player will always chose !! = 0 because this yields the highest payoff for him. 
Players will not contribute more than !!"# because the MPCR from contributing to the public 
good is smaller than 1, i.e. ! < 1. Hence, if !! ≥ !!"#, it is sufficient to show that a player i 
will contribute !! = !!"# if and only if  
 
                                             !! !!"#, !!! >   !! 0, !!!                  ∀  !!! ∀! ∈   ! ⇔                     ! − !!"# + ! !!!∈!\{!} + !!!"#    > ! − ! + ! !!!∈!\{!}  ⇔                                                                                                 !!!"# − !!"# > −!  ⇔                                                                ! > !!"# 1 − !  
 
This means that only if the sanction of not complying is larger than the gain, deviating is not 
beneficial for the player and thus this strategy will not be chosen. Hence, if condition 
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! > !!"# 1 − !  holds, then the strategy profile !! = !!!" is the strictly dominant strategy for 
all institution members in the contribution stage. 
 
Case (2): If ! is not a member of the institution, i.e. ! ∉ !: 
 
Since ! < 1, for all non-members, i.e. for all ! ∉ !, the strategy profile !! = 0 is the strictly 
dominant strategy in the contribution stage. 
 
Therefore, we have the following Nash equilibria in each subgame that starts at stage 3: (1) If 
S≠ ∅ and ! > !!"# 1 − ! , then !! =    !!"# for all ! ∈ ! and !! =   0 for all ! ∉ !, (2) If S= ∅, 
then !! = 0  for all i. 
 
Additional analysis if ! = !". Note, that the deposit can also be a fraction of the initial 
endowment, i.e. d = δw. Then, the analysis looks at follows: 
 
Case (1)’: If !	  is a member of the institution, i.e. ! ∈   !: 
 
Players will prefer to contribute !! = c!"# over !! = 0, hence any !! < c!"#, if and only if 
 
                                             !! c!"#, !!! >   !! 0, !!!      ∀  !!! ∀! ∈   ! ⇔           !! − c!"# + ! !!!∈!\{!} + !c!"#    > ! − !" + ! !!!∈!\{!}  ⇔                                                                                           !c!"# − c!"# > −!"   ⇔                                           c!"# 1− ! > !" ⇔                                                        ! > !!"#! 1− ! ∈]0,1[ 
 
Since 0 ≤ c!"# ≤ !  and ! > 0, 0 < !!"#! < 1  and since ! < 1 , (1− !) > 0 . If c!"# = ! , 
then ! > 1− ! . If the contribution is any fraction of the initial endowment, i.e. c!"# = !", 
with k ∈]  0,1[,  then ! > ! 1− ! . This means that the contribution strategy depends on the 
size of the deposit paid, or more explicitly the fraction !: 
 c!"#  if  ! > !!"#! 1− !  and                        !!∗(!) =      0                     if  ! < !!"#! 1− !                     
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Case (2)’: If ! is not a member of the institution, i.e. ! ∉ !: 
 
As before, since ! < 1, for all ! ∉ !, the strictly dominant strategy in the contribution stage is 
the strategy profile !! = 0. 
 
Thus, we have the following Nash equilibria in each subgame that starts at stage 3: (1) If 
S≠ ∅ and ! > !!"#! 1− ! , then !! = c!"# for all i ∈ S and !! =   0 for all i ∉ S, (2) If S≠ ∅ 
and ! < !!"#! 1− ! , then !! = 0 for all i, (3) If S= ∅, then !! = 0  for all i. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.1. It is continued with the application of backward induction. First the 
implementation stage is considered. It follows from the definition of !∗ that if ! < !∗, no 
institution will be formed and thus only action profiles without lodging a deposit are Nash 
equilibria. If ! ≥ !∗ there exist two Nash equilibria: A deposit and a status quo equilibrium. In 
the deposit equilibrium, the unanimity rule implies that not a single player rejects the 
implementation of the institution. The status quo equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, in which 
at least one participant rejects it. Thus, in case ! ≥ !∗, an institution can be formed and the 
following strategy possibilities for a deposit equilibrium exist: (1) a subset of players, s, lodge 
the deposit and the other players do not, (2) If precisely !∗ players participate, every single 
participant agrees on the actual lodgment of the deposit (unanimity rule). Else, each 
participant rejects the implementation of the institution, and (3) if an institution is 
implemented, institution members contribute c!"# and non-members contribute zero.  
Next, the participation stage is considered. If ! < !∗, no institution is formed and 
hence no one will contribute to the public good. Thus, !! = !  ∀! in the participation stage. 
Consider next the case if ! ≥ !∗. Note that in the deposit equilibrium, everyone agreed upon 
the implementation of the institution. For all i, the payoffs in the deposit equilibrium are as 
follows: 
 ! − c!"# + !"c!"#     if ! ∈   !               !! = ! + !"c!"#                 if ! ∉ !                
 
 
A participant receives ! − c!"# + !"c!"#  if an institution emerges and receives !  if he 
deviates and thus no institution is formed. Since we have ! ≥ !∗, the former payoff is always 
strictly larger than !, i.e. ! − c!"# + !"c!"# >   !. Additionally, non-participants are also 
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strictly better off by not participating, i.e. ! + !"c!"# > ! − c!"# + !"c!"#. Hence, no one 
has an incentive to deviate and thus a deposit equilibrium induces a Nash equilibrium in the 
first stage. 
However, for every institution size s (1≤ s ≤ n) there also exist a status quo 
equilibrium. Consider a Nash equilibrium without an institution (a status quo equilibrium) in 
the implementation stage. If this is the case, each player who considers whether to participate 
in the institution or not, is indifferent between the two options, irrespective of the behavior of 
the other players and hence each action profile induces a non-strict Nash equilibrium in the 
participation stage. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.2. Proposition 2.1 states that the necessary condition for a deposit 
equilibrium is that at least !∗ players participate, i.e. s≥ !∗. Now, it is shown that the case, 
where exactly !∗  players lodge the deposit, is the unique strict subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium. Consider the following cases. 
 
Case (1): Let ! > !∗ and an institution is implemented. Players know that one participant can 
opt out of the institution but the institution of size ! − 1 will still be implemented. Since ! + !   ! − 1 c!"# >   ! − c!"# + !"c!"#, any one can increase his payoff by choosing to leave 
the institution and thus has a material incentive to do so. 
 
Case (2): If ! = !∗, deviation for a member of the institution would lead to a reduction in 
payoff from ! − c!"# + !!∗c!"# to !. Furthermore, there is no incentive for any additional 
player to join since ! + !!∗c!"# > ! − c!"# + !  (!∗ + 1)c!"#.  
 
Case (3): If ! = !∗ − 1, participation for a non-participant of the institution leads to an 
increase in payoff from !  to ! − c!"# + !!∗c!"# . Hence, each non-participant has an 
incentive to join. Finally, any action profile with ! < !∗ − 1  can be a non-strict Nash 
equilibrium. 
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Proof of Lemma 2.2: If !! < 1 − !  ∀! ∉ !  and !   > !!"#(1 − !)  ∀! ∈ ! , then members 
contributing !!"#, i.e. !! = !!"# ∀! ∈ !, and non-members contributing zero, i.e. !! = 0 ∀! ∉ !, 
is a Nash equilibrium. To see this, consider members first. In stage 3 all ! ∈ ! have lodged the 
deposit !. The utility function for all ! ∈ ! is (Equation (2.7)): 
 !! = ! − !! − ! + ! !! + ! !! + !!!!∉!!∈!\{!} − !! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!                  −!! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!! −!! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!! − !! !!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!     
 
Given !! = 0 and !! = !!"#, player i will contribute !! = !!"# instead of !! ≠ !!"# if and only 
if: 
 
                                                   !!∗ !!"#, 0, !!"# ≥ !!∗ !! , 0, !!"#                 ∀!! ≠ !!"#,∀! ∈ ! 
 ⇔ ! − !!"#   + ! !!"# + !!∈!\{!} !!"# −   !!!!"# ≥   !   − !! − ! + ! !!"# + !!!!∈!\{!} −   !!(!! − !!"# + !) −   !!(!! + !) −   !! !!"# − !! −   !) 
 
There are two possible cases: Player ! can either contribute zero, i.e. !! = 0 or he can chose an 
amount larger than zero but below the minimum contribution level, i.e. 0 < !! < !!"# . 
Theoretically, also the case where !! > !!"# exists. Since in the experiment, however, the 
minimum contribution level was chosen to be the whole endowment, the strategy space was 
limited and thus the third case can be ruled out here. The two possible cases are analyzed 
separately. 
 
Case (1): First consider the case !! = 0. If !! = 0, then ! = ! ∀  ! ∈   !. Player i will contribute !! = !!"# instead of !! = 0 if and only if 
 
                                                 !!∗ !!"#, 0, !!"# ≥ !!∗(0, 0, !!"#)               ∀  ! ∈   ! 
 
 
By contributing zero, ! ∈   ! has an advantageous disutility compared to ! ∈ !. But since !! = 0 
implies that i has to pay the deposit !, the advantageous disutility from the lower contribution 
and the disadvantageous disutility from paying the deposit compared to all members ! ∈ !, 
have opposing forces; either player ! is worse off than the members of the institution (if 
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! > c!"# then −!! ! − c!"# )  or he is better off (if  ! < c!"# then !! !!"# −   !)). Moreover, 
since player ! loses the deposit by contributing zero, he has some disadvantageous disutility 
compared to non-members (−!!!): 
 ⟺ ! − !!"#   + ! !!"# + !!!"#!∈!\{!} −   !!c!"# ≥   ! − !   + ! c!"#!∈!\{!} − !! ! − c!"# −!!! − !! !!"# −   !) 
 ⟺   !!!"# − !!"# − !!c!"# ≥   −!   − !! ! − c!"# − !!! − !! !!"# −   !) 
 ⟺   !   ≥ !!"#(1 − !) 
 ⇒   !   > !!"#(1 − !) 
 
Thus, contributing !! = !!"#  ∀  ! ∈   !  strictly dominates contributing !! = 0  ∀  ! ∈   !  if !! = 0 
and !! = !!"# as long as the institution is credible, i.e. !   > !!"# 1 − ! . 
 
Case (2): Next, consider the case 0 < !! < !!"#. If !! < !!"#, then ! = ! ∀  ! ∈   !. Player i will 
contribute !! = !!"# instead of !! < !!"# if and only if 
 
                    !!∗ !!"#, 0, !!"# ≥ !!∗(!! , 0, !!"#)              ∀  0 < !! < !!"#, ∀  ! ∈   ! 
 ⟺ ! − !!"#   + ! !!"# + !!!"#!∈!\{!} −   !!c!"# ≥ ! − !! −   ! + ! !!"# + !!∈!\{!} !!                                                                   −!!(!! + ! − !!"#)−!!(!! + !) − !! !!"# − !! −   !) 
 ⟺    !!"# ! − 1−2!! + !! ≥ !! ! − 1−2!! + !! −!(1 + 2!! − !!) 
 ⇒    !!"# ! − 1−2!! + !! > !! ! − 1−2!! + !! −!  (1 + 2!! − !!) 
 
 
 
Since !! < !!"#  and !  (1 + 2!! − !!) > 0 , !!"# ! − 1−2!! + !!  is strictly larger than !! ! − 1−2!! + !! −!  (1 + 2!! − !!). Thus, contributing !! = !!"#  ∀  ! ∈   ! strictly dominates 
contributing !! < !!"# ∀  ! ∈   ! if !! = 0 and !! = !!"#. 
 
This leads to the intermediate result:  
 !!∗ !!"#,!, !!"# > !!∗ !!,!, !!"#   ∀!! ≠ !!"#,∀! ∈ ! if !   > !!"#(! − !). 
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Consider non-members next; it has to be shown that also no ! ∉ ! has an incentive to deviate 
if !! < 1 − !. The utility function for all  ! ∉   ! is (Equation (2.8)): 
 !! = ! − !! + ! !! + ! !! + !!!!∉!\{!}!∈! − !! !! max !! − !! , 0!!!!                                        −  !! !!!!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!!! −!! !! max !! − !! , 0!!!! −   !! !!!!!! max !! − !! , 0!!!!!!!!       
 
Given !! = 0 and !! = !!"#, player i will contribute !! = 0 instead of !! ≠ 0 if and only if: 
 !!∗ 0, 0, !!"# ≥ !!∗ !! , 0, !!"#   ∀!! > 0,∀! ∉ ! 
 
If everyone not in the institution contributes nothing (including ! ∉ !), whereas members 
contribute !!"# , then player i gets advantageous disutility compared to members of the 
institution because of their contribution !!"#. Thus we have: 
 !!∗ 0, 0, !!"# = ! + ! !!"# − !!!!"#!  
 
Non-members can get both disadvantageous utility compared to members as well as non-
members, and advantageous disutility compared to members only. Thus the utility function 
becomes: 
 !!∗ !! , 0, !!"# = ! − !! + ! !!"#! + !!! − !!(!! − !!"#)   − !!!! − !!(!!"# − !!) 
 
Again, there exist two cases: Player ! can either contribute more than zero but less than the 
minimum contribution amount, i.e. 0 < !! < !!"#  or he can chose to pay the minimum 
contribution amount, i.e. !! = !!"#. Again, a contribution above the minimum contribution 
amount, i.e. !! > !!"#, is ruled out by the experimental setting. 
 
Case (1): First, consider the case 0 < !! < !!"# . Player ! will contribute !! = 0 instead of 0 < !! < !!"# if and only if 
 
                                   U!∗ 0, 0, !!"# ≥ U!∗ c!, 0, !!"#                   ∀  0 < !! < !!"#,∀i ∉ S 
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⇔                     ! + ! !!"# − !!!!"#! ≥   ! − !! + ! !!"#! + !!! − !!!! − !!(!!"# − !!) 
 ⇔ 0 ≥ !! ! − 1 − !!!! + !!!! 
 ⇔ !!!! ≤ !! 1 − ! + !!!! 
 ⇔ !! ≤ 1 − ! + !! 
 ⇒ !! < 1 − !     
 
This condition strictly holds because, by assumption, !! ≥ !! and 1 − ! > 0 because 0 < ! <1. Thus, U!∗ 0, !!"#, !!"# > U!∗ c!, !!"#, !!"#   ∀c! > 0,∀i ∉ S if and only if !! <   1 − !. 
 
Case (2): If !! = !!"#. Then 
               ! + ! !!"# − !!! !!"# ≥ ! − !!"# + ! !!"#! + !!!"# − !!!!"# 
 ⇔ −!!!!"# ≥ !!!"# − !!"#   − !!!!"# 
 ⇔ !! ≤ 1 − ! + !! 
 ⇒ !! < 1 − !     
 
This condition strictly holds because, by assumption, !! ≥ !! and 1 − ! > 0 because 0 < ! <1. Thus, U!∗ 0, !!"#, !!"# > U!∗ c!, !!"#, !!"#   ∀c! > 0,∀i ∉ S if and only if !! <   1 − !. 
 
Thus, we have: !!∗ !,!, !!"# > !!∗ !!,!, !!"#   ∀!! ≠ !!"#, ∀  ! ∉ ! if !! < ! − !.  
 
Therefore, !! = !!"# for all ! ∈   ! and !! = ! for all ! ∉ ! is a strict Nash equilibrium if !   > !!"#(! − !) ∀! ∈ ! and !! < ! − ! ∀  ! ∉ !. 
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2.5.2 Experimental Instructions 
 
General Information 
 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation. Please read 
these instructions carefully. Please switch off your mobile phone and do not communicate 
with any other participant anymore. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of 
the experimenters will then come to your table and answer your question personally. 
 
You can earn money in this experiment. The amount earned depends on your own decisions 
and the decisions made by the other participants of this experiment. All decisions made 
during the experiment as well as your final earnings remain anonymous. 
 
In this experiment the currency Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) is used. At the end of the 
experiment all ECU amounts that you have earned in the course of the experiment will be 
summed up and converted to EURO, using the following exchange rate: 
 
200 ECU = 1 Euro. 
 
The Euro amount will then be paid out in cash. Additionally, each participant gets an amount 
of 2.50 Euro, which will be paid independently of the decisions made during the experiment. 
 
You find the exact description of the experiment on the following pages. 
 
 
Contribution Decision 
 
The experiment consists of 20 identical decision rounds. At the beginning of each round all 
players are divided into groups of 4 players. The composition of the group is thereby 
randomized, which means that each group of four will be randomly determined before each 
new round starts.  
 
At the beginning of each round, each participant gets an endowment of 40 ECU. Each player 
decides how much of the 40 ECU he wants to keep for himself and how much he wants to 
invest in a group project.  
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After all players have made their decision, each player is informed about the total amount, 
which has been invested in the group project. The individual contributions however remain 
anonymous. The individual earnings of each participant in one round consist of two parts: 
 
1. The amount the participant kept for himself 
2. Plus 0.65 times the sum of all contributions to the group project. 
 
Therefore, the individual earnings of each participant in one round can be calculated with the 
following formula: 
 
Earnings = 40 – individual contribution + 0.65 * joint contributions to the group project 
 
Here are some examples. If all four group members (including yourself) decide to invest 0 
ECU in the group project, then your individual earnings from this round are 40 – 0 + 0.65 x (4 
x 0) = 40 ECU. 
 
If you decide to invest 40 ECU, another group member also invests 40 ECU and the other two 
group members invest 0 ECU in the group project, then your individual earnings from this 
round are 40 – 40 + 0.65 x (40 + 40 + 0 + 0) = 52 ECU. (If you would have been one of the 
two players who invested 0 ECU, your individual earnings from this round would have been 
40 – 0 + 0.65 x (40 + 40 + 0 + 0) = 92 ECU.) 
 
If all four group members (including yourself) decide to invest 40 ECU in the group project, 
then your individual earnings from this round are 40 – 40 + 0,65 x (4 x 40) = 104 ECU. 
 
The individual earnings from each round are publicized to the corresponding participant on 
the screen.  
 
Possibility to Lodge a Deposit 
 
Before making the above-explained contribution decision, each participant has the possibility 
to decide at the beginning of each round whether he wants to lodge a deposit of 0 ECU [10 
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ECU, 20 ECU, 40 ECU]30. If a participant lodges the deposit, it will be only refunded if the 
participant invests 40 ECU in the group project. The ECU amount, which is lodged as the 
deposit, can be provided independently of the endowment of 40 ECU. 
 
A participant who wants to lodge the deposit can bind his choice on the following condition: 
He can decide on how many members of his group in total, including himself, at least have to 
lodge the deposit in order to make him want to lodge the deposit. Only if his required 
minimum number of participants is met, the participant actually lodges the deposit.  
 
The following figure summarizes all possible courses of events of the deposit lodgments: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Thereafter, each player makes his contribution decision, i.e. each player decides how much of 
the 40 ECU he wants to keep for himself and how much he wants to invest in the group 
project (see section contribution decision, p. 2).  
 
If you lodge the deposit but invest less than 40 ECU in the group project, then the deposit 
amount will be subtracted from your earnings in that round. Though, the laboratory team 
assures that your earnings in one round - with or without lodging the deposit – cannot be less 
than 0 ECU. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  The instructions	  for	  IF0,	  IF10,	  IF20,	  and	  IF40	  only	  differed	  in	  the	  deposit	  amounts.	  Putting	  the	  numbers	  used	  in	  IF10,	  IF20,	  and	  IF40	  between	  brackets	  indicates	  this	  here.	  These	  were,	  of	  course,	  not	  part	  oft	  he	  initial	  instructions.	  
You lodge the deposit 
(and all participants, whose required 
minimum number of participants is 
met, lodge the deposit as well) 
2
deposit 
no 
Your required minimum 
number of participants 
who lodge the deposit is 
met 
 
Your required minimum  
   number of participants who          
       lodge the deposit is not    
            met 
You do not lodge 
the deposit  
1
yes 
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Thus, each round consists of the following two steps: 
 
Step 1: Possibility to lodge a deposit conditioned on the minimum number of participants  
             who lodge the deposit 
Step 2: Contribution decision 
 
The total earnings of each participant in this experiment are the sum of all earnings from all 
20 rounds. 
 
End of the Experiment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the earnings from all rounds are summed up, converted into 
EURO and the amount plus 2.50 Euro is paid out to you in cash.  
 
Please remain seated and wait until the experimenter will call your seat number to pay you the 
amount you have earned during this experiment. 
 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 	  	  	  
When you have finished reading the instructions and all your questions are clarified, please 
press the button “forward” on your screen. 
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Control Questions 
 
1. How many ECU do you get at the beginning of each round? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. How many ECU can you maximally keep for yourself? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How many ECU can you maximally invest in the group project? 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Does the composition of the groups of four players change during the experiment? 
                        yes              no 
 
5. Will your individual contribution to the group project be revealed to the other players? 
                        yes              no 
 
6. Will the sum of all contributions to the group project be revealed? 
                        yes              no 
 
7. Can you freely choose whether to lodge the deposit or not? 
                        yes              no 
 
8. If you lodged the deposit and choose to invest less than 40 ECU in the group project, 
will the deposit be refunded? 
                        yes              no 
 
9. If you lodged the deposit and choose to invest 40 ECU in the group project, will the 
deposit be refunded? 
                        yes              no 	  
10. When is your individual earning from one round higher? Possibility (1): If no one in 
the group lodges the deposit and all group members (including yourself) decide to 
invest 0 ECU in the group project. Possibility (2):  If all group members lodge the 
deposit and all group members (including yourself) decide to invest 40 ECU in the 
group project?  
                        Possibility 1                                   Possibility 2 
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11. If you indicated that you lodge the deposit if at least 3 participants lodge the deposit, 
but there are only 2 participants in total willing to lodge the deposit, will you then 
lodge the deposit?  
                        yes              no 
 
12. If you indicated that you lodge the deposit if at least 3 participants lodge the deposit 
and there are 4 participants willing to lodge the deposit, will you then lodge the 
deposit?  
                        yes              no 
 
13. If you want next to yourself at least 2 other participants lodging the deposit, to lodge 
the deposit yourself, what is the required minimum number of participants you have to 
indicate? 
                1                          2                         3                      4 	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2.5.3 Decision Trees 	  
FIGURE 2.4: OVERVIEW OF DECISIONS  
 
(A) DECISION TREE EXPERIMENT THIS STUDY 
 
	  	  	  	  
(B) DECISION TREE EXPERIMENT KOSFELD ET AL. (2009) 
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Chapter 3 
Can’t Wait to Be Nice: Self-Control and Cooperation in an 
Intertemporal Trust Game 
 
The content of the following chapter was produced in collaboration with Mattia Nardotto and 
Bettina Rockenbach* 
 
3.1 Introduction 	  
Social dilemmas are situations, where private interests collide with societal concerns and, 
independent of individual intelligent pursuit of interest, no socially optimal outcome emerges. 
Classical examples are the provision of public goods or common pool resources. A vast 
literature analyzes behavioral pattern to understand potential underlying mechanisms for 
defective behavior in social dilemmas. Recent studies investigate whether the tension between 
the individual rationality of self-interest and collective wellbeing might also represent a self-
control dilemma, where the individual has to trade off the objective of acting pro-socially 
(cooperative) and the temptation to act selfishly (Kocher et al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 
2012).31 Curry et al. (2008) argue that if a social dilemma evokes a self-control conflict, then 
individuals with stronger preferences for future over immediate rewards should be more likely 
to be more cooperative and that there is a positive correlation between (the individual degree 
of) self-control and cooperative behavior in a social dilemma. The experimental evidence 
reported so far suggests that a high level of self-control leads to significantly higher 
contributions in a public goods game if this is perceived as a self-control conflict (Kocher et 
al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 2012). Moreover, studies that link impatience and cooperation in 
a social dilemma agree that more impatient individuals contribute less to a public good than 
patient ones (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011) and defect more in a prisoner`s 
dilemma (Harris & Madden, 2002).  
All these studies measure the individual degree of self-control independently from the 
contribution decision in the public good game, where the choice tasks to elicit time 
preferences consist of lotteries that embrace payoffs that differ very much from those in the 
cooperation game. Most importantly, the typical choice task to elicit time preferences does 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged. 31	  A self-control dilemma is defined as an interpersonal conflict between better judgment and temptation (Thaler 
& Shefrin, 1981; Schelling, 1984; Loewenstein, 1996, 2000).  
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not involve a second person. Rather, the decision maker’s choices only affect his own payoff 
and therefore his decisions are made in a socially detached environment. However, if social 
dilemmas represent a self-control conflict, any choice involves both a temporal as well as a 
social dimension. Other research fields show that behavior changes when individual 
preferences interact with social preferences, such as a shift towards more conservative risk 
behavior when decisions are made in a social context than when made individually (Song, 
2008; Reynolds et al., 2009; Charness & Jackson, 2009) or less liability towards 
overconfidence (Sniezek & Henry, 1989; Plous, 1995). If time and social preferences interact, 
there is the possibility of reinforcement or counterbalance. A person’s social preferences 
might outweigh his individual present-bias. Or, ones’ own self-control problem dominates the 
social element, as suggested by the literature. Eliciting both preferences separately and 
measure their correlation thereafter might therefore not be appropriate in all situations. 
Arguing that both preferences are relevant, it is not clear why the temporal component 
(individual degree of self-control) should predominate the social aspect and necessarily lead 
to less cooperation. Instead, it is possible that the choice differs profoundly for the decision 
maker if the intertemporal decision is made in interaction with another person. Addressing 
this problem is important for two reasons. Firstly, intertemporal decisions made in a social 
environment are ubiquitous, i.e. in a family, firm or institution. Second, if intertemporal 
decisions are different when being made in a social context, it is especially relevant for (the 
timing of) policy decisions. Moreover, it can affect the performance of a broad range of 
economic and social institutions (Frederick et al., 2002). 
The aim of this study is to analyze whether there is an interaction between 
intertemporal preferences and cooperative behavior, using a novel experimental setting that 
addresses the problem of joint elicitation. To do so, we modify a standard time preference 
experiment to bring it into a social dimension. Behavior is then compared to the same choices 
made in a socially detached environment. This set up allows us to investigate the interplay 
between time preferences and cooperation in a more structured way. Especially, it offers the 
opportunity to analyze the correlation in behavior when both preferences interact.  
Building on a standard experimental design to measure time preferences (i.e. Thaler, 
1981; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1986; Benzion et al., 1989; Shelley, 1993; Green et al., 1994), 
we implement an experiment, where we let individuals state their preferences over 
intertemporal money streams of a smaller-sooner and larger-later reward. To be able to 
identify self-control problems, we ask subjects the same choice pair in the close and in the far 
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future. 32  To capture the social component, we replace the usual lotteries of the time 
experiment by the trust game employed in Bohnet & Zeckhauser (2004). By doing so, we can 
explicitly disentangle stochastic risk from social risk. This is essential because both types of 
risk play an important role in our setting. For intertemporal choices, the literature agrees that 
the joint elicitation of stochastic risk and time preferences is crucial since both preferences are 
closely intertwined (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Anderhub et al., 2001; Andersen et al. 2008). 
Also cooperation in a social dilemma involves trusting the other persons and therefore is 
closely associated with the willingness to take risk (Ben-Ner & Puttermann, 2001; Camerer, 
2003; Cook & Cooper, 2003; Kocher et al., 2011). This type of risk, however, is a social risk 
since it originates from the decisions of other human beings.33  
We implement three treatments, each of which consists of two rounds. All three 
treatments offer exactly the same monetary payoff for the decision maker. Thus, if decision 
makers only maximize their payoffs and the probabilities of securing them, there should be no 
behavioral differences between the treatments. However, the context varies. Our main 
treatment is an intertemporal trust game. Choices made in the intertemporal trust game are 
compared to an intertemporal decision problem, where the payoffs and time frames are the 
same but no other subject is involved, as in a standard experiment for intertemporal 
preferences. The two treatments differ in two domains. Firstly, in the intertemporal trust 
game, the decision determines not only one’s own payoff but also the payoff of another 
person. Hence, other-regarding preferences, such as inequality aversion, altruism or efficiency 
concerns might play a role. Secondly, in the intertemporal trust game another person – not 
nature – is the main source of uncertainty. Hence, next to the stochastic risk inherent in the 
lottery, some social risk might be added. If the bad outcome realizes, some additional 
psychological costs – so-called betrayal costs (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004) – might have an 
influence on the decisions. To account for these elements, a third treatment – an intertemporal 
risky dictator game – is added, which has the same payoffs and probabilities as the 
intertemporal trust game, but the outcome is determined by nature. As in the trust game, 
however, another person is involved and payoffs depend on the decision maker’s choices.  
The main experimental findings are as follows. First, we can confirm the presence of 
betrayal aversion in our intertemporal setting. It seems that the importance of social risk 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  A self-control conflict occurs when time preferences are present-biased, which means that when considering 
trade-offs between two future moments, the relative weight given to the earlier moment is stronger when the 
moment gets closer (O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999a). 33	  Kocher et al. (2011) find that trust elicited by a trust game is significantly associated with public good 
contributions, whereas stochastic risk preferences elicited in a standard risk attitude elicitation experiment (i.e. 
Holt & Laury, 2002) do not correlate with contributions to the public good.	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remains for intertemporal decisions. We do not, however, find that social comparison per se 
does play a role. The mere presence of a passive dependent does not make a difference in the 
decision maker’s willingness to take risk. Second, we do not find any differences in behavior 
between present-biased individuals and those with time-consistent preferences in the 
intertemporal trust game. When making an intertemporal choice in interaction with another 
person and both dimensions are elicited jointly, individuals that display self-control problems 
when deciding only for themselves do not cooperate less than those individuals who behaved 
time-consistently in a socially detached environment. This result suggests that the social 
component outweighs the temporal aspect. Third, the share of present-biased choices 
decreases in the intertemporal dictator game compared to the individual intertemporal 
decision problem but not in the intertemporal trust game. A possible explanation is that 
responsibility has an influence on intertemporal decisions. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2 the experiment is 
described in more details. Section 3.3 comprises the hypothesis development. In section 3.4 
experimental results are presented. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
We consider the same binary-choice task in three decision situations: The intertemporal trust 
game (ITG), the intertemporal decision problem (IDP), and the intertemporal risky dictator 
game (IRD). In each treatment, the decision maker (DM) has a choice between a safe amount 
and a risky outcome. The safe strategy results in a safe outcome of 10, whereas the payoffs of 
the risky choice can be either higher (15) or lower (8) than the safe outcome. Figure 3.1 
presents the three decision trees with the payoff structure employed in each.  
 
FIGURE 3.1: DECISION TREES ALL TREATMENTS 
         A. Intertemporal Trust             B. Intertemporal Decision                C. Intertemporal Risky 
              Game (ITG)          Problem (IDP)        Dictator Game (IRD) 
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We calibrate risk acceptance in the three decision situations by asking the DM about his 
minimum acceptable probability (MAP) of receiving the high payoff in order to prefer the 
risky choice to the safe amount. Subjects know that prior to the experiment a probability, !, of 
receiving the high payoff has been determined, which is the same in all treatments. If their 
MAP is higher than !, they earn the safe payoff. If their MAP is lower or equal to !, they 
choose the risky choice. This implies that the less the DM likes the gamble, the higher his 
MAP should be.34  
Our main treatment is the intertemporal trust game, where the risky choice consists of 
the trust game employed in Bohnet & Zeckhauser (2004). If the DM’s MAP exceeds !, the 
safe outcome is realized and the DM as well as the trustee earn (10, 10). If the DM’s MAP is 
lower than or equal to !, the DM participates in a trust game, where he allows the trustee to 
determine the final payoffs. Simultaneously, the trustee can either choose option C 
(cooperate) yielding outcomes (15, 15) or option B (betray) yielding outcomes (8, 22) for the 
DM and the trustee, respectively (see Figure 3.1, panel A). In case the trust game is played, 
the two final payoffs are then decided by the decision of the trustee with whom the DM has 
been randomly paired. 
Decisions made in the intertemporal trust game are compared to the intertemporal 
decision problem. Payoffs are the same for the DM but no other person is involved. As 
before, if the DM’s MAP exceeds !, he earns the safe amount of 10. Yet, if the DM’s MAP is 
lower than or equal to !, the outcome of the risky option is determined by a random draw with 
a !–chance of receiving 15 and a (1 − !)–chance of receiving 8 (see Figure 3.1, panel B).  
The two treatments differ in two domains. First, in treatment ITG, another person – 
not nature – is the main source of uncertainty. Second, the decision also determines the payoff 
of another person. To control for these aspects, we run a third treatment: The intertemporal 
risky dictator game. In this treatment, as in treatment ITG, another person is affected by the 
DM’s choices. The critical difference is that – as in treatment IDP – the outcome of the risky 
choice is determined by chance (see Figure 3.1, panel C).  
As already pointed out, our experimental design introduces a novel element: The 
treatments have an intertemporal structure, in the sense that the timing of the realization of the 
decisions differs. The safe outcome is realized at an earlier date in time. The outcome of the 
risky choice, on the other hand, is paid out one day later. Every treatment consists of 2 
decisions. In the first decision, the safe outcome is paid out one day after the experimental 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 This mechanism is incentive compatible. The reported MAP of a rational decision maker should be the 
probability that makes him indifferent between the safe outcome and the risky outcome since individuals cannot 
affect the probability of the risky choice.  
	   52	  
session (!!= tomorrow).35 The risky outcome is paid out one day later (!!= in 2 days). To test 
for preference reversals, the second decision consists of the same choices at a later point in 
the future, where the safe outcome is paid out in 30 days (!! =  in 30 days) and the risky 
outcome is paid out one day later (!! =  in 31 days). Payoffs and their timing were presented 
to subjects in a neutral form (see Appendix 3.6.3). 
The value of ! is established from the trustees’ decisions in the intertemporal trust 
game. While DM’s indicate their required minimum probability of trustworthy behavior in 
order to trust, trustees simultaneously choose between option C and B.36 The value of ! then 
is the fraction of trustees who choose to reward trust in the trust game, with a distinct ! 
calculated in each session. Thus, ! is the probability that if the DM trusts, his trust is 
rewarded, or put differently, the probability of receiving 15 in the risky option.37 The DMs are 
informed about this procedure. Trustees are not informed about the specifics of the MAP-
procedure and do not know that their decision help to determine !. In treatments IDP and 
IRD, we inform DMs that ! has been determined before they make their decisions. The 
derivation of ! is not revealed. Table 3.1 gives an overview of the three treatments.  
 
TABLE 3.1: OVERVIEW TREATMENTS 	  
Treat-­‐	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Payoffs	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Payoff	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Payoff	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Determinant 
ment	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Realization	   	  	  	  	  	  	  Realization	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  Risky	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Round	  1	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Round	  2	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  Outcome	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
 
       DM             Recipient/Trustee 
  
ITG        10                      10                        !! = tomorrow             !! = in 30 days     Trustee’s  
                  (15, 8)                (15; 22)                      !! = in 2 days     !! = in 31 days       Choice 
                                          
IDP        10                        -                        !! = tomorrow      !! = in 30 days        Nature 
              (15, !; 8, 1-!)         -           !! = in 2 days               !! = in 31 days            
 
IRD        10                      10                        !! = tomorrow              !! = in 30 days        Nature 
              (15, !; 8, 1-!)    (15, !; 22, 1-!)              !! = in 2 days                !! = in 31 days            	  	  
Treatment IDP allows us to measure people’s (individual) time preferences. The 
difference in the MAPs between the short run future trade-off and the long run future trade-
off reflects the compensation for delaying the monetary reward. We call this compensation 
time compensation. When comparing the MAP in treatment IRD to the MAP in treatment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 The earliest payment date (!!) was chosen to be the next day to eliminate the problem of front-end delay. 
36 Thus, we applied the strategy method for trustees. The literature agrees that results in investment games 
obtained by the strategy method or with an experimental choice task do not differ (i.e. Ashraf et al., 2006). 
37 The elicitation procedure is similar to the Becker-DeGroot-Marshak mechanism (Benhabib et al., 2010). The 
main difference is that ! is not generated randomly from a uniform distribution. 
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IDP, any additional compensation on top of the time compensation results from the presence 
of another person. We call this the social compensation. Finally, any difference between the 
MAP in treatment ITG and the MAP in treatment IRD reflects the extra compensation for 
potentially being betrayed by another person. We call this betrayal compensation. 
Pairs were matched at the beginning, but payoffs of all three treatments were only 
shown at the end of the experiment to avoid players’ behavior being influenced by 
experience.38 At the end of the experiment, each player received an overview of all choices 
made in the experiment and the corresponding tokens earned in each round. Only then the 
participants could deduce the choices made by their partners. We used a within-subject design 
to be able to analyze potential behavioral changes depending on the different contexts. To 
avoid any order effects, the order of the treatments was randomized. The participants got new 
instructions after each round. The preference reversal literature suggests that people shall not 
see both decisions at the same time to avoid making any choices based on average 
calculations. The distribution of instructions was used to insure that there is some time 
between the decisions. Moreover, it gave us the possibility to apply both within as well as 
between treatment analyses. Since the former potentially could have been sensitive to order 
effects, the distribution of instructions after each round insured that players did not know that 
a larger-later question would come in the first round. If there were any order effects, we could 
have used only the first part of each session as an independent observation.  
 One round was randomly drawn to be payoff relevant. The payoff was transferred to 
each participant’s bank account at the specific date to ensure that transaction costs were 
unitized among all participants. Moreover, the chair handed out a transferal guarantee to 
remove uncertainty about payments (see Appendix 3.6.4). Participants had the chance to leave 
before the experiment started getting the show up fee of 2.50 Euro if they did not want to or 
could not give us their bank account details. In total, only two people chose this option.  
The experiments were run at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. The 
experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In 
total, 86 subjects recruited via the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004) participated 
in the experiment; 30 subjects in the first and third session and 26 subjects in the second 
session.39 Subjects were randomly assigned to role A (DM) and B (recipient/ trustee) and then 
pairs of two were randomly matched (partner matching). In treatment IDP, all participants – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Moreover, only after all players have participated in all treatments (and especially in treatment ITG), we could 
deduce ! and thus derive final payoffs. 
39 Initially, we had a forth session with 30 more participants. These data had to be removed since the software 
broke down in the middle of the experiment. 
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irrespective of their role – were DMs. Thus, we have 15, 13, and 15 independent observations 
in session 1, 2, and 3, respectively, yielding 43 independent observations in total. Each 
treatment consisted of three sessions. Each session lasted about 60 minutes. On average a 
subject earned 7.50 Euro (about $10.20) in the experiment. 
 
3.3 Hypotheses 
 
To capture the phenomenon of self-control problems, behavioral economists suggest various 
specifications of discounting (i.e. Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue 
& Rabin, 1999a). In this paper, we adopt the quasi-hyperbolic framework to model 
intertemporal preferences due to its simplicity and tractability and predominant use in the 
literature. Moreover, it is perfectly in line with our behavioral assumptions and is compatible 
with present-biased preferences but also allows for time-consistent behavior. 40 Let !! be a 
person’s cardinal instantaneous utility function in period ! and !! !! , !!!!,… , !!  represent a 
person’s intertemporal preferences from the perspective of period !. Then, the hyperbolic 
structure assumes the following functional form for a person’s intertemporal utility function: 
 !! !! , !!!!,… , !! = !! + ! !!!!!!!!!! , for all !                                      (3.1) 
 
where ! > 0 and ! ≤ 1. In this formulation, !! represents the long run discount function, and ! is the present-biased parameter. The quasi-hyperbolic discounting model assumes that the 
per-period discount rate between now and the next period is !!!"!" , whereas the per-period 
discount rate between any two future periods is !!!! < !!!"!"  since ! > 0. Hence, the (!, !)-
formulation assumes a declining discount rate between this period and next but a constant 
discount rate thereafter. This captures exactly the problem of self-control we consider here. 
Applying the quasi-hyperbolic discount framework to our setting, a subject has 
present-biased preferences if the MAP for the question between tomorrow and in 2 days 
(short run future) is higher than for the equivalent question between 30 days and 31 days 
(long run future). On the contrary, a subject has time-consistent preferences if the MAP is the 
same in both time frames. In treatment IDP, we ask for the minimum probability, !!, for the 
high outcome (15) to arise in order to play the lottery in ! + 1 against the alternative to get 10 
at date !. Then, the probabilities in the short and long run future for the DM are such that 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 There also exist other models, such as models of willpower and temptation (i.e. Benabou & Tirole, 2004) or 
multiple selves’ models (i.e. Fudenberg & Levine, 2006) to capture present-biased preferences.  
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! 10 = !!!!"# 15 + (1 − !!!)!"#(8)                                                     (3.2) 
 !!!"! 10 = !!!!!!"! 15 + (1 − !!!)!!!"!(8)                                              (3.3) 
 
Rewriting equations (3.2) and (3.3), the short run and long run future probabilities become 
 !!! = ! !" !!"# !!"[! !" !!(!)]                                                                               (3.4) 
 !!! = ! !" !!" !![! !" !!(!)]                                                                                 (3.5) 
 
It can be easily seen that the two equations only coincide when ! = 1. If instead ! < 1, then 
the MAP asked in the short run future is larger than in the long run future. Let’s call the 
difference in MAPs time compensation and define it as !!"#$ ≡ !!! − !!!. Then 
 !!"#$ = ! !" !!"# !!"[! !" !!(!)] − ! !" !!" !! ! !" !! ! = (!!!)! !(!")![! !" !! ! ]                          (3.6) 
 
Since !!!"#$!" < 0,41 the time compensation increases with the extent of the present bias. Thus, 
the larger the bias for immediate gratification, i.e. the lower !, the higher the compensation a 
person asks for in order to participate in the lottery in the short run future. Note that our main 
focus is on the presence of present-biased preferences, and not on its intensity. Since we link 
self-control (not impatience) and cooperation, we opt for a simple design, abstaining from a 
more complicated preference elicitation procedure. Notice, however, that !!! and !!!  are 
functions of other parameters than !, such as the risk attitude, i.e. the curvature of the utility 
function, and the impatience parameter !. Because we are not interested in these parameters, 
we consider the difference in the MAPs, which is informative only on !, as the other factors 
affecting choice are held constant by design.42 We can now deduce the first hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.1: Players with present-biased preferences ask for a higher MAP in the short 
run than in the long run future. Thus: !!"#$ > 0. 
 
The second hypothesis assumes the existence of betrayal aversion. This implies that players 
ask for a higher premium when they have to trust another person compared to the case, where 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  !!!"#$  !" = !! !" ∗[!" ! !" !! ! ) ![(! ! !" !! ! )∗(! !" !!" !" )][!"(! !" !! ! ]! < 0. 
42 More precisely, the observed choices inform us only about whether ! < 1, i.e. the existence of a present bias, 
not its intensity. In general, we cannot say how much of !!"#$ is due to !,  ! and the risk attitude of the subject.  
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nature determines the outcome. This additional premium compensates for the psychological 
costs of (potentially) being betrayed. Let’s define this cost of betrayal as 1− !, where 0 < ! ≤ 1. Then, the probabilities for the short run and long run future decisions in the 
intertemporal trust game are such that 
 ! 10 = !!!!"# 15 + 1 − !!! !"#$ 8                                                   (3.7) 
 !!!"! 10 = !!!!!!"! 15 + 1 − !!! !!!"!"(8)                                       (3.8) 
 
with short run and long run future probabilities 
 !!! = ! !" !!"#$ !!"[! !" !!"(!)]                                                                         (3.9) 
 !!! = ! !" !!"# !![! !" !!"(!)]                                                                        (3.10) 
 
Comparing equations (3.9) and (3.10) to (3.4) and (3.5), shows that the additional costs of 
betrayal aversion further increase the MAPs. Thus: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.2: Players ask for a higher premium in the intertemporal trust game 
compared to the intertemporal decision problem (!!! > !!!  and !!! > !!! ) as well as the 
intertemporal risky dictator game (!!! > !!!  and !!! > !!! ), both in the short run future and in 
the long run future. 
 
The intertemporal risky dictator game may differ from the intertemporal decision problem by 
an additional social compensation. However, a clear hypothesis about the direction of this 
compensation is difficult to make. If players care about inequality aversion, the MAP should 
increase when moving from the one-person choice context to the social context of the dictator 
game. However, altruism or efficiency preferences would work in the opposite direction, 
increasing the attractiveness of the gamble and thus would lead to a reduction in the MAPs. 
Which of the two effects dominates is unclear ex-ante and might depend on other factors, 
such as the size of payoffs. However, there is ample evidence that people seem to care about 
disparities in payoffs, i.e. are inequality averse (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2000). If we incorporate social preferences into our utility function, using the inequity-
aversion model suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), the level of MAPs should increase in 
the intertemporal risky dictator game, both in the short run future and in the long run future 
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compared to the intertemporal decision problem. To see this, the probabilities including 
inequality aversion are such that ! 10 = !!!!"# 15 + 1 − !!! !"[! 8 −∝ ! 15 − ! 8 ] 
in the short run future and !!!"! 10 = !!!!!!"! 15 + 1 − !!! !!!"[!(8)−∝ ! 15 −! 8 ]  in the long run future. The parameter ∝  measures the decision maker’s 
disadvantageous inequality aversion.43 Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), it is assumed that ∝> 0.  Thus, we have !!! = ! !" !!"[! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ]!"[! !" !! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ]  and !!! = ! !" !![! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ]![! !" !! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ] , 
respectively. Comparing !!!  and !!!  to equations (3.4) and (3.5) immediately reveals that the 
probabilities to compensate for inequality aversion in the dictator game are larger than the 
time compensation in the individual decision problem. Since !!!!!∝ < 0  and !!!!!∝ < 0 , the 
probability increases with an increase in the disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter ∝.44 Therefore, we derive a hypothesis about the general ordering of the premiums. Let’s 
define the social compensation as !!"#$%&! ≡ !!!   − !!!  and !!"#$%&! ≡ !!!   − !!!  and the betrayal 
compensation as !!"#$%&%'! ≡ !!!   − !!!  and !!"#$%&%'! ≡ !!!   − !!! . This leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.3: Players, who are betrayal and inequality averse, ask for the highest 
premium in the intertemporal trust game, followed by the intertemporal risky dictator game 
and ask for the lowest premium in the intertemporal decision problem. Hence: !!"#$%&%' >  !!"#$%& > !!"#$ both in the short run and in the long run future. 
 
We can now move to the set of behavioral hypotheses on the interaction of time and social 
preferences. As already mentioned before, our design allows us to distinguish between 
present-biased individuals and time-consistent individuals. If present-biased preferences lead 
to less cooperation, subjects displaying these preferences should give up to temptation and 
trust less often (DM) and reward trust less often (trustees) in the intertemporal trust game. 
This implies that the MAPs of time-inconsistent subjects are higher than those of time-
consistent ones. Moreover, decision maker and trustees with present-biased preferences 
should trust/ reward trust more often in the long run than in the short run future. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Note that, in our setting, a DM can never be better off than the recipient and thus there is no advantageous 
inequality aversion. The ! used in our equation is the present-bias parameter, not the parameter for being better 
off as used in Fehr & Schmidt (1999).	  44	  !!!!!∝ = !!"(! !" !! ! )∗[!" ! !" !! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ![!" ! !" !! ! ∗(! !" !!"(! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ][!"(! !" !! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ]! < 0	  and 	  !!!!!∝ = !!(! !" !! ! )∗[! ! !" !! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ![! ! !" !! ! ∗(! !" !!(! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ][!(! !" !! ! !∝ ! !" !! ! ]! < 0.	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HYPOTHESIS 3.4: Decision makers with present-biased preferences trust less often than 
decision makers with time-consistent preferences and reward trust less often as trustees. 
Moreover, decision makers/ trustees with present-biased preferences trust less/ reward trust 
less in the short run future than in the long run future. 
 
If, however, the interplay between intertemporal preferences and social preferences is such 
that the social element outweighs the intertemporal dimension, there should be little or no 
difference in behavior between present-biased and time-consistent individuals in the 
intertemporal trust game. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3.5: If the social dimension outweighs the intertemporal dimension, then there 
should be little or no difference in the choice to trust by decision makers who have present-
biased preferences and those who have time-consistent preferences. The same holds for the 
decision to reward trust by the trustees.  
 
3.4 Experimental Results 
 
Before starting our analysis, a preliminary step is required. Since our subjects make choices in 
all treatments, and behavior in a treatment might change depending on the previous treatment, 
we check for order effects. However, we do not find significant order effects (Appendix 
3.6.1). Moving to the analysis of subject behavior in the treatments, our evidence confirms the 
presence of present-biased preferences in the intertemporal decision problem. However, this 
difference disappears when intertemporal choices are made in interaction with another person, 
i.e. in a social environment. 
 
RESULT 3.1: Overall, MAPs for the short run future are higher than the MAPs for the long 
run future in the IDP treatment. In treatments IRD and ITG, however, there is no difference in 
the MAPs between the short run and long run future. 
 
Support for result 3.1 is presented in Figure 3.2, which shows the cumulative distribution of 
MAPs per treatment. It can be seen that there is a difference between the average short run 
future MAP (!"#!) and the long run-future MAP (!"#!) in the intertemporal decision 
problem, but neither in the intertemporal trust game nor the intertemporal risky dictator game. 
Table 3.2 (upper part) summarizes the average MAPs in the short run and long run future per 
treatment. The average !"#! and !"#! in the IDP treatment are around 57 and 55 percent, 
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respectively. This difference is significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p=0.0471). The 
average !"#! and !"#! are 76.09, 74.77 and 58.23, 58.02 for treatments ITG and IRD, 
respectively. This difference is not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, ITG: p=0.6696; 
IRD: p=0.6566). Hence, we do find present-biased preferences in the decision problem and 
thus Hypothesis 3.1 cannot be rejected. However, choices are more time consistent in the 
other two treatments and the present-bias disappears.  
 
FIGURE 3.2: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION MAPs SHORT AND LONG 
 
 
TABLE 3.2: AVERAGE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITIES 	  	                    Treatment 
 
       ITG                    IDP         IRD                                 
      Average MAPs 
Short Run     76.1      57.3      58.2 
 Long Run      74.8      54.9      58.0 	  	   	                future      cons.    present    future      cons.    present    future      cons.    present  
 
      Average MAP DM 
 Short Run              74.8       74.3       83.6        48.3       55.8       66.1         67.2       53.3       71.0 
 Long Run              74.2       73.4       80.0        65.2       55.8       47.2         65.6       52.9       72.5 
       Reward Trust Trustees  
 Short Run              0.20       0.42       0.33             
Long Run                 0.40       0.38       0.25    	  
Note: The numbers depict percentages. Furthermore, future = future-biases, cons. = time-consistent, and present 
= present-biases. 
 
Next, we consider the role of betrayal aversion. Our result confirms the finding of Bohnet & 
Zeckhauser (2004) and suggests that betrayal aversion also plays a crucial role in an 
intertemporal context. 
 
RESULT 3.2: The premiums asked for in the intertemporal trust game are significantly higher 
than in the intertemporal decision problem as well as in the intertemporal risky dictator 
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game, both in the short run and in the long run future. Betrayal aversion persists in an 
intertemporal context. 
 
Consider Table 3.2 (upper part). Average MAP levels are around 57, 76, and 58 percent for 
the short run future in treatments IDP, ITG, and IRD, respectively. The average !"#! is 
significantly higher in treatment ITG compared to both the IDP and IRD treatments 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, ITG vs. IDP: p=0.0000; ITG vs. IRD: p=0.0002) for the short run 
future. The same holds for the long run future, where the average MAPs are around 55, 75, 
and 58 percent in treatments IDP, ITG, and IRD, respectively. Again, the average !!"! is 
significantly higher in treatment ITG compared to both the IDP and IRD treatments 
(Wilcoxon signed-rank test, ITG vs. IDP: p=0.0000; ITG vs. IRD: p=0.0002). Hence, we 
cannot reject Hypothesis 3.2. 
In the following, we analyze whether social comparison affects behavior in our 
experiment. Results show that subjects do not behave differently in the risky dictator game 
than in the individual decision problem, neither in the short nor in the long run future. 
However, as pointed out in the previous section, we only observe the net result of opposing 
forces: inequality aversion, altruism or efficiency and their individual effect cannot be 
disentangled with our design. Hence, we cannot say whether the different social motives 
might cancel each other out or social comparison per se is not important in our environment.  
 
RESULT 3.3: There is no significant difference between the premiums asked in the 
intertemporal decision problem and the intertemporal risky dictator game. Thus, on net, 
behavior is not influenced by social comparison. 
 
Again, consider Table 3.2 (upper part). The average !"#!’s are 57.31 and 58.09 in IDP and 
IRD, and the average !"#!’s are 54.87 and 58.02 in IDP and IRD, respectively. Thus, the 
premiums asked in IRD are slightly higher than in the IDP treatment, especially in the long 
run future. However, this difference is not significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, short: 
p=0.2236; long: p=0.1887). This finding is in line with the findings of Bohnet & Zeckhauser 
(2004) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2010).45 Result 3.2 and 3.3 are summarized in Figure 3.3, 
which depicts the cumulative distribution of short and long run MAPs per treatment. It shows 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Bolton & Ockenfels (2010) find that social comparison plays an important role in risk-taking but only under 
certain conditions. When inequality results from the risky choice (as in our setting), risk-taking is not affected by 
social comparison. 
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that the premium is similar in the decision problem and the dictator game. However, when 
there is social risk, premiums are much higher.  
 
FIGURE 3.3: CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION MAPs ALL TREATMENTS 
 (A) SHORT RUN                 (B) LONG RUN 
              
 
 
Next, we analyze the order of premiums. Result 3.3 has shown that the difference of the 
MAPs between the intertemporal decision problem and the intertemporal risky dictator game 
is not significant. However, MAPs are slightly higher in the intertemporal risky dictator game 
than in the intertemporal decision problem (see Table 3.2).  Indeed, we find that the order of 
premiums are as predicted both in the short as well as the long run future: !!"#$%&%'! > !!"#$%&! >!!"#$  and !!"#$%&%'! > !!"#$%&! > !!"#$ . This ascending order is highly significant (Jonkheere 
Terpstra test for ascending order, short: p=0.9915; long: p=0.9998).46 Thus, Hypothesis 3.3 
cannot be rejected as well. 
 
RESULT 3.4: Players ask for the highest compensation in the intertemporal trust game, 
followed by the intertemporal dictator game and the intertemporal decision problem. Thus, 
the betrayal compensation is higher than the social compensation, is higher than the time 
compensation. 
 
For the following analysis, where time preferences are linked to cooperative behavior, we 
categorize individuals as present-biased (!!"#$ > 0), time-consistent (!!"#$ = 0) and future-
biased (!!"#$ < 0). First, note that the distribution of time preferences in our subject pool is in 
line with general findings in the literature (Frederick et al., 2002). In our subject pool, about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 The Jonkheere Terpstra test for ascending order cannot reject the hypothesis that the order of alternatives is 
ascending von !!"#$ over !!"#$%& to !!"#$%&%'   both for the short and long future horizon at the 1% level. 
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23 percent of participants have a bias for immediate gratification, 65 percent are time-
consistent, and around 12 percent are future-biased (see Figure 3.4).  
 
FIGURE 3.4: DISTRIBUTION OF TIME PREFERENCES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Now, we analyze the core question of our study: How are time preferences and behavior in 
the cooperation game interlinked. Remember, we hypothesized that if time preferences 
predominate the social component, DMs who have present-biased preferences should trust 
less often compared to people with time-consistent preferences and trustees should reward 
trust less often (Hypothesis 3.4). If, however, the social context outweighs the individual time 
preferences, there should be no difference in cooperative behavior between time-inconsistent 
and time-consistent individuals (Hypothesis 3.5). Our data suggest the following result: 
 
RESULT 3.5: Players with present-biased time preferences and those with time-consistent 
preferences do not behave differently in the social context. We do not find a correlation 
between time preferences and cooperation behavior in the trust game. 
 
Table 3.2 (lower part) summarizes average MAPs per treatment categorized by their time-
preferences. It can be seen, that present-biased decision makers ask for higher MAPs and thus 
trust less often in the trust game than consistent individuals. Time-consistent individuals ask, 
on average, for a MAP of 74 percent in the short run versus 84 percent of time-inconsistent 
individuals. In the long run, average MAPs of consistent individuals lies at 74 percent and 
around 80 percent for people with present-biased preferences. This difference is not 
significant, neither in the short nor the long run future (Wilcoxon signed-rank, short: 
p=0.2563; long: p=0.9426). If we now look at the behavior of trustees, a similar picture arises. 
Trustees with present-biased preferences do reward trust less often both in the short (33 
percent of trustees reward trust vs. 42 percent of time-consistent ones) and in the long (25 
percent vs. 38 percent) but this difference fails to be significant (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, 
11.63%	  
65.12%	  
23.26%	  
future-­‐biased	   time-­‐consistent	   present-­‐biased	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short: p=0.6037; long: p=0.4224). Hence, according to our evidence, Hypothesis 3.4 is 
rejected but Hypothesis 3.5 cannot be rejected. 
 Summarizing, our results suggest that – when using joint elicitation of time and social 
preferences – the social context outweighs individual problems of self-control. However, due 
to the small sample size, our results have to be treated with caution. The lack of significance 
could also be a result of lacking power. To check for the robustness of our results, we 
implemented a data simulation. Even with a simulated sample size of more than 500 subjects, 
the difference in the cooperation rate between subjects that displayed present-biased 
preferences in the individual decision problem and those who behaved time-consistently 
would become only marginally significant (see Appendix 3.6.2). This strengthens the 
robustness of our results.  
Finally, we have another interesting descriptive finding. We have seen that, on 
average, both in the intertemporal risky dictator game as well as in the intertemporal trust 
game, there is no significant difference between the short run and long run MAPs. However, 
when looking at the proportion of consistent and inconsistent choices, we find that choices 
become more consistent in the intertemporal risky dictator game compared to the 
intertemporal decision problem but not in the intertemporal trust game. Table 3.3 summarizes 
the percentage of consistent and inconsistent choices among treatments; 72 percent of choices 
are time-consistent in the IRD treatment compared to 65 and 55 percent in IDP and ITG, 
respectively. Most importantly, the proportions of present-biased choices are around 23 
percent in IDP and ITG, but only 12 percent in the IRD treatment. This difference is 
marginally significant (One-sample test of proportion: p= 0.0355), whereas the proportions 
are the same between ITG and IDP (One-sample test of proportions, p=0.9943). Figure 3.5 
depicts the short run and long run average MAPs per treatment. The forty-five-degree line 
indicates than the MAPs are the same and thus is the reference line for consistency. As can be 
seen, in the IRD game, choices seem to be more consistent than in the other two treatments. 
Choices are much more present-biased (below the forty-five degree line) in the IDP and do 
not change much in the ITG treatment. 
It seems that people are more (time-) consistent when a passive dependent bears the 
consequences of their choices. However, in the trust game where the other person actively 
takes part in the decision process, behavior does not change. A possible explanation might be 
that responsibility influences subjects’ behavior when facing intertemporal choices. 
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TABLE 3.3: PROPORTION CONS./ INCONS. INDIVIDUALS PER TREATMENT 	  	                    Treatment 
 
       IDP       ITG      IRD 
                                   	   	                future      cons.    present    future      cons.    present    future      cons.    present  
 
Percentage of choices            11.63      65.12     23.26      20.93      55.81     23.26 16.28     72.09     11.63 
Absolute Number             (10) (56)      (20) (9) (24) (10)    (7)  (31)    (5) 	  
 
FIGURE 3.5: MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE PROBABILITIES SHORT AND LONG RUN 
      
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In the framework of this study, we investigate the interplay between self-control and 
cooperative behavior. Former studies find that there is a positive correlation between self-
control and contributions to a public good (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011, 
Kocher et al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 2012). However, such correlation might arise due to the 
particular experimental setting. In these studies time preferences are elicited in a socially 
detached environment and linked to cooperative behavior thereafter. However, many 
intertemporal choices, such as policy decisions, simultaneously adhere a temporal as well as a 
social dimension. We address this problem by offering a novel experimental setting that is 
based on a joint elicitation of both preferences. We modify a standard time preference 
experiment to put it into a social context. To capture the social component, we replace the 
usual lotteries of time experiments with the trust game employed in Bohnet & Zeckhauser 
(2004). The results show that betrayal aversion persists in an intertemporal setting. The 
premiums are, on average, significantly higher when a trustee is involved. However, when 
another person silently bears the consequences of the decision maker’s choices, premiums do 
not differ from the individual context. This is in line with previous findings that social 
comparison per se does not change behavior (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Bolton & 
Ockenfels, 2010). Moreover, we do not find any difference in the trusting behavior between 
present-biased individuals and those with time-consistent preferences when eliciting social 
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and time preferences simultaneously. People that display problems of self-control when only 
deciding for themselves, behave similar to time-consistent people in the intertemporal trust 
game. This result suggests that the social component outweighs individual time preferences.   
We have an additional interesting descriptive result. The data suggest that choices 
become more time-consistent in the intertemporal dictator game but not in the intertemporal 
trust game. The core difference between the two treatments is that in the dictator game the 
decision maker decides for himself and a passive dependent who does not have any active 
role. In the trust game, however, the trustee actively participates in the decision process. This 
result opens the question of how responsibility might influence intertemporal choices. There 
are many studies that investigate the role of responsibility in variant contexts, such as risk 
aversion (Song, 2008; Charness & Jackson, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2009; Bolton & Ockenfels, 
2010) and cooperation (Charness et al., 2007; Sutter, 2009; Engel & Rockenbach, 2011; 
Humphrey & Renner, 2013). However, as to our knowledge, there is no study that 
investigates the influence of responsibility on intertemporal choices. This remains an 
interesting question for future research. 
The experimental setting suggested in this study goes beyond the existing literature by 
bringing a standard time preference experiment into a social dimension. It supplements the 
existing literature with the suggestion of an experimental design for the joint elicitation of 
time and social preferences in order to understand behavioral pattern that might govern the 
choices in an intertemporal context with social interaction. Our results suggest that people 
behave differently when both preferences interact than when choices are made separately. 
Hence, for several decisions a joint elicitation of time and social preferences might be more 
appropriate.  
By eliciting time preferences in a social context, our experimental design reflects 
many real life decisions. Important examples are policy decisions, where the decision maker 
(politician) has to make intertemporal decisions while interacting with the members of the 
parliament and voters (social interaction). Our finding that the social aspect outweighs the 
intertemporal dimension in a cooperation game has important implications for policy 
decisions, i.e. with respect to the provision of public goods. Contradictory to previous 
findings in the literature, it suggests that the probability to contribute to a public good does 
not depend on the timing of the decision. 
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3.6 Appendix 
 
3.6.1 Tests For Order Effects 
 
TABLE 3.4: OVERVIEW OF ORDER EFFECT ANALYSIS 
 
                        Kolmogorov-Smirnov         Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
               Intertemporal Decision Problem (IDP) 
      
IDP First vs. Not First         !!"#$     p=0.781   p=0.3091 
           !!!    p=0.303   p=0.2354 
                                                       !!!    p=0.336   p=0.1424 
IDP First vs. IDP Second                  !!"#$   p=0.636   p=0.0524 
           !!!    p=0.467   p=0.1449 
                                                        !!!    p=0.631   p=0.6408 
IDP First vs. IDP Third         !!"#$   p=0.855   p=0.3942 
           !!!    p=0.088   p=0.0096 
                                                       !!!    p=0.320   p=0.0553 
  
                            Intertemporal Risky Dictator Game (IRD) 
      
IRD First vs. Not First         !!"#$   p=0.921   p=0.3238 
           !!!     p=0.486   p=0.3958 
                                                       !!!     p=0.328   p=0.2709 
 
        Intertemporal Trust Game (ITG) 
      
ITG First vs. Not First                   !!"#$   p=0.563   p=0.4158 
            !!!     p=0.209   p=0.0886 
                                                        !!!     p=0.209   p=0.0562 
                                                           !!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%' 
      
IDP First vs. Not First        (!!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%')!  p=0.777   p=0.6360 
          (!!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%')!  p=0.617   p=0.3375 
IRD First vs. Not First       (!!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%')!  p=0.328   p=0.1302 
          (!!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%')!  p=0.878   p=0.5863 
ITG First vs. Not First        (!!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%')!  p=0.132   p=0.0534 
          (!!"#$%& +   !!"#$%&%')!  p=0.310   p=0.1379 
 
                                 !!"#$%& 
      
IDP First vs. Not First        !!"#$%&!    p=0.481   p=0.3091 
          !!"#$%&!    p=0.481   p=0.3807 
IRD First vs. Not First        !!"#$%&!    p=0.948   p=0.9551 
          !!"#$%&!    p=0.535   p=0.0667 
ITG First vs. Not First        !!"#$%&!    p=0.577   p=0.2840 
          !!"#$%&!    p=0.563   p=0.3733 
 
                                   !!"#$%&%' 
      
IDP First vs. Not First        !!"#$%&%'!    p=0.966   p=0.8979 
          !!"#$%&%'!    p=0.586   p=0.3373 
IRD First vs. Not First         !!"#$%!"#!    p=0.230   p=0.0587 
          !!"#$%&%'!    p=0.148   p=0.0892 
ITG First vs. Not First        !!"#$%&%'!    p=0.269   p=0.0903 
          !!"#$%&%'!    p=0.080   p=0.0094 	  
Note: Neither the epsilons nor the probabilities are normally distributed. The order of treatments has been IDP, 
IRD, ITG; ITG, IRD, IDP, and IRD, IDP, ITG.  
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3.6.2 Data Simulation 
 
TABLE 3.5: AVERAGE MAPs SIMULATED DATA 	  	            Treatment 
 
            ITG                       Wilcoxon Signed 
                       cons.             present                              Rank Test 
 
N=172     
 
      Average MAP DM 
 Short Run                   74.3               83.6                                     p=0.1061 
 Long Run                   73.5               80.0                                     p=0.9184 
       Reward Trust Trustee  
 Short Run                   0.42              0.33                             p=0.4598        
Long Run                      0.38               0.25                             p=0.2534  
  
 N=258 
 
       Average MAP DM 
 Short Run                   74.3               83.6                        p= 0.1001 
 Long Run                   73.5               80.0                        p=0.8999 
       Reward Trust Trustee 
 Short Run                   0.42              0.33                             p=0.3643        
Long Run                     0.38               0.25                             p=0.1609  
   
  
 N=344 
 
      Average MAP DM 
 Short Run                   74.3               83.6                        p= 0.0973 
 Long Run                   73.5               80.0                        p=0.8844 
       Reward Trust Trustee 
 Short Run                   0.42              0.33                             p=0.2943        
Long Run                      0.38               0.25                             p=0.1051 
  
 N=430 
 
      Average MAP DM 
 Short Run                   74.3               83.6                        p= 0.0912 
 Long Run                   73.5               80.0                        p=0.8707 
       Reward Trust Trustee 
 Short Run                   0.42              0.33                             p=0.2407        
Long Run                      0.38               0.25                             p=0.0998  
  
 N=516 
 
      Average MAP DM 
 Short Run                   74.3               83.6                        p= 0.0521* 
 Long Run                   73.5               80.0                        p=0.8585 
       Reward Trust Trustee 
 Short Run                   0.42              0.33                            p=0.1985        
Long Run                      0.38               0.25                             p=0.0874* 	  
Note: Table 3.5 illustrates the minimum acceptable probabilities for the realization of the high outcome in the 
lottery in order to choose the gamble over the safe amount. This implies that the numbers depict percentages. 
Furthermore, cons. = time-consistent, and present = present-biases. *significant at 10%. Wilcoxon signed rank 
test: Difference between MAPs asked by present-biased and time-consistent individuals in the intertemporal trust 
game. 
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3.6.3 Experimental Instructions 
 
General Information 
 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation. Please read 
these instructions carefully. Please switch off your mobile phone and do not communicate 
with any other participant anymore. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of 
the experimenters will then come to your table and answer your question personally. 
 
You can earn money in this experiment. The amount earned depends on your decisions as 
well as the decisions of other participants made during the experiment. All decisions made 
during the experiment as well as your final earnings remain anonymous. 
 
In this experiment the currency Experimental Currency Unit (ECU) is used. This experiment 
consists of three parts with two rounds each. After each participant has made his decisions in 
all three parts, the individual earnings from all rounds in all three parts are shown to the 
corresponding participant on the screen. Then, one of the rounds is randomly chosen to be 
payoff-relevant; thereby, the probability of being chosen is exactly the same for all rounds. 
The ECU amount of the randomly drawn round will be converted to Euro, using the following 
exchange rate: 
 
1 ECU = 0.50 Euro. 
 
The timing of the payment depends on the choices you have made in the round that has been 
randomly chosen. Additionally, each participant gets an amount of 2.50 Euro, which will be 
paid independently of the decisions made during the experiment. The whole Euro amount will 
be transferred to your bank account. We assure you the certainty of your future payments. 
 
All payment dates in this experiment are the date, where the bank transfer is disposed.  
 
You will get the instructions for the second round of this part after having finished the first 
round. The instructions of parts 2 and 3 will then be distributed sequentially. 
 
You find the exact description of the first round of part I on the following pages. 	  
IDP: Round 1 [Round 2] 
 
In this round, you have the choice between options O [Q] and P [R].  
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If you choose option O [Q], you will earn a safe amount of 10 ECU, which will be transferred 
to you tomorrow [in 30 days].  
 
If you choose option P [R], you participate in a lottery, where you earn with probability p an 
income of 15 ECU (alternative 1) and with probability (1-p) an income of 8 ECU (alternative 
2). Your earnings from option P will be transferred to you in 2 days [in 31 days]. 
 
Hence, the individual earning possibilities of each participant in this round are: 
 
 
Option         Nature of Choice        Probability   Your Earnings      Payment 
O     Certainty      10      tomorrow 
[Q]             [in 30 days] 
P     Lottery 1       p   15      in 2 days 
[R]    2            (1-p)     8    [in 31 days] 
 
 
The value of probability p that the lottery produces alternative 1 has been fixed in advance. 
Neither you nor any other participant of the experiment learns the true value of p. Your choice 
does not influence the value of p. We kindly ask you to answer the following question: 
 
How large does the probability p of the lottery producing alternative 1 minimally have to be 
for you to pick option P [Q] over option O [R]? 
(Please indicate the minimum probability in %!) 
 
If your minimal value for the probability is larger than the actual probability, you 
automatically choose option O [Q] and earn 10 ECU in this round, which will be transferred 
to you tomorrow [in 30 days]. If your minimal value for the probability is equal to or smaller 
than the actual probability, you automatically participate in the lottery. Your earnings then 
depend on the outcome of the lottery, where you earn with a given probability of p 15ECU 
and with a given probability of (1-p) 8 ECU. The earnings from option P[R] will be 
transferred to you in 2 days [in 31 days].  
 
After you have made your decision, the second round of part I [part II of the experiment] will 
begin.  
 
When you have finished reading the instructions and all your questions are clarified, please 
press the button “forward” on your screen. 
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IRD: Round 1 [Round 2] [*Role B] 
 
In this part of the experiment, you interact with another person. At the beginning of the 
experiment, you were randomly assigned to role A [*B]. Each participant with role A [*B] is 
randomly matched with a participant with role B [*A]. You will never learn the identity of the 
participant that you have been matched with. The matching remains constant during the whole 
experiment. 
 
In this round, you have [*participant A has] the choice between options S [U] and T [V|. With 
your choice, you decide about your own earnings as well as the earnings of the participant 
with role B, which has been randomly assigned to you. [*With his choice, participant A 
decides about his own earnings as well as your earnings.] The participant with role B does not 
make any active decision. [*You do not make any active decision]. 
 
If you choose [*participant A chooses] option S [U], you as well as participant B [*A] will 
earn a safe amount of 10 ECU in this round, which will be transferred to both of you 
tomorrow [in 30 days].  
 
If you choose [*participant A chooses] option T [V], you participate in a lottery, where you as 
well as participant B [*A] earn with probability p an income of 15 ECU (alternative 1) and 
with probability (1-p) you earn an income of 8 ECU [*22 ECU] and participant B [*A] earns 
an income of 22 ECU [*8 ECU] (alternative 2). The earnings from option T will be 
transferred to you as well as participant B [*A] in 2 days [in 31 days]. 
 
Hence, the individual earning possibilities of each participant in this round are: 
 
 
Option           Nature of            Probability          Your          Earnings    Payment 
                       Choice           Earnings           Person B [*A]          
 
S          Certainty    10            10     tomorrow 
[U]            [in 30 days] 
T          Lottery      1  p  15       15           in 2 days 
[V]        2              (1-p)    8 [*22]      22 [*8]         [in 31 days] 
 
 
The value of probability p that the lottery produces alternative 1 has been fixed in advance. 
Neither you nor any other participant of the experiment learns the true value of p. Your choice 
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does not influence the value of p. We kindly ask you to answer the following question [*In 
the following, we kindly ask you to wait until participant A has answered the question]: 
 
How large does the probability p of the lottery producing alternative 1 minimally have to be 
for you to pick option S [U] over option T [V]? 
(Please indicate the minimum probability in %!) 
 
If your [the] minimal value for the probability [*chosen by participant A who has been 
randomly assigned to you] is larger than the actual probability, you [*he] automatically 
choose [chooses] option S [U] and you as well as participant B [*A] earn 10 ECU in this 
round, which will be transferred to both of you tomorrow [in 30 days]. If your [the] minimal 
value for the probability [*chosen by participant A who has been randomly assigned to you] 
is equal to or smaller than the actual probability, you automatically participate in the lottery. 
Your earnings as well as the earnings of participant B [*A] then depend on the outcome of the 
lottery, where you as well as participant B [*A] earn with a given probability of p 15ECU and 
with a given probability of (1-p) you earn 8 ECU [*22 ECU] and participant B [*A] earns 22 
ECU [*8 ECU]. The earnings from option T[V] will be transferred to you as well as 
participant B [*A] in 2 days [in 31 days].  
 
After you [*participant A has] have made your [*his] decision, the second round of part II 
[part III of the experiment] will begin.  
 
When you have finished reading the instructions and all your questions are clarified, please 
press the button “forward” on your screen. 
 
ITG: Round 1 [Round 2] [*Role B] 
 
In this part of the experiment, you interact with another person. At the beginning of the 
experiment, you were randomly assigned to role A [*B]. Each participant with role A [*B] is 
randomly matched with a participant with role B [*A]. You will never learn the identity of the 
participant that you have been matched with. The matching remains constant during the whole 
experiment. 
 
In this round, you have [*participant A has] the choice between options W [Y] and X [Z].  
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If you choose [*participant A chooses] option W [Y], you as well as participant B [*A] will 
earn a safe amount of 10 ECU, which will be transferred to both of you tomorrow [in 30 
days].  
 
If you choose [*participant A chooses] option X [Z], your earnings depend on the choice 
made by participant B. [*your earnings as well as the earnings of participant A depend on 
your choice]. Participant B has [*You have] the choice between alternative 1 and 2. If 
participant B chooses [*you choose] alternative 1, you as well as participant B [*A] earn 15 
ECU. If participant B chooses [*you choose] alternative 2, you earn 8 ECU [*22 ECU] and 
participant B [*A] earns 22 ECU [*8 ECU]. The earnings from option X will be transferred to 
both of you in 2 days [in 31 days]. 
 
Hence, the individual earning possibilities of each participant in this round are: 
 
 
Option           Nature of            Your          Earnings    Payment 
                       Choice           Earnings           Person B [*A]                    
 
W          Certainty    10            10     tomorrow 
[Y]            [in 30 days] 
X          Person B chooses 1   15       15           in 2 days 
[Z]          [*You choose]    2                8 [*22]      22 [*8]         [in 31 days] 
 
 
We kindly ask you to answer the following question: 
 
How large would the probability p of being paired with a participant B who chooses 
alternative 1 minimally have to be for you to pick option X [Y] over option W [Z]? 
(Please indicate the minimum probability in %!) [*Which alternative, 1 or 2, do you choose in 
option X [Z] ] 
 
Based on the decisions of all participants with role B, the actual probability that alternative 1 
is chosen, will be calculated. The actual probability with which participant B choosing 
alternative 1 will not be revealed to you. Neither you nor any other participant of the 
experiment learns the true value of p. Your choice does not influence the value of p.  
 
[*At the same time, all participants with role A indicate their minimal value for the 
probability that they are paired with a participant B who chooses alternative 1, in order to pick 
option X[Y] over option W[Z].] 
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If your [the] minimal value for the probability [*chosen by participant A who has been 
randomly assigned to you] is larger than the actual probability, you  [*he] automatically 
choose [chooses] option W [Y] and you as well as participant B [*A] earn 10 ECU in this 
round, which will be transferred to both of you tomorrow [in 30 days]. If your [the] minimal 
value for the probability [*chosen by participant A who has been randomly assigned to you] 
is equal to or larger than the actual probability, your earnings as well as the earnings of 
particiant b [*A] depend on the choice of participant B [*your choice]. If participant B 
chooses [*you choose] alternative 1, you as well as participant B [*A] earn 15 ECU. If 
participant B chooses [*you choose] alternative 2, you earn 8 ECU [*22 ECU] and participant 
B [*A] earns 22 ECU [*8 ECU]. The earnings from option X [Z] will be transferred to you as 
well as participant B [*A] in 2 days [31 days]. 
 
[After you have made your decision, the second round of part III will begin.]  
 
End of the experiment 
 
When the experiment is finished, please remain seated and wait until the experimenter will 
call your seat number. Please fill in your bank account details in the destined slip of paper and 
take it with you when you come to the front. The team will hand out a certificate for your 
participation and the amount you earned during the experiment. 
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
 
When you have finished reading the instructions and all your questions are clarified, please 
press the button “forward” on your screen. 
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3.6.4 Certificate for Transferal of Earnings 
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Chapter 4 
Responsibility Effects in Intertemporal Decision Making 
 
The content of the following chapter was produced in collaboration with Mattia Nardotto and 
Bettina Rockenbach* 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Intertemporal choices – decisions comprising trade-offs among costs and benefits occurring at 
different points in time – are among the most important choices made by economic agents. 
Whenever costs and benefits are spread over time, the possibility of meaningful comparison 
requires the calculation of present-value equivalents, which depends on the respective 
discount rate. Then, the discount rate used by an individual is a reflection of his subjective 
time preference (Harrison et al., 2002). In the standard experimental method to elicit time 
preferences (i.e. Thaler, 1981; Tversky & Kahnemann, 1986; Shelley, 1993; Green et al., 
1994), subjects state their preferences over (a set of) trade-offs between a smaller-sooner and 
larger-later payment. By varying time frames and monetary amounts, the implicit individual 
discount rate can be inferred. The majority of people thereby display a tendency towards 
impatience (for an overview see Frederick et al., 2002). Moreover, enormous evidence 
suggests that people have present-biased preferences, which means that they assign especially 
high value to immediate gratification when choices are tempting compared to any future time 
(i.e. Rachlin et al., 1991; Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Myerson & Green, 1995; Kirby & 
Maracovic, 1996; Kirby, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999b, 2001; Harrison et al., 2002; 
Benhabib et al., 2010).47 In all these studies, the typical choice task to elicit time preferences 
consists of decisions, where the decision maker’s choices exclusively affect his own payoff.  
The aim of this study is to analyze behavior when someone has to make an 
intertemporal decision while being responsible for another person, i.e. when the decision has 
payoff consequence not only for himself but also for someone else, whose time preferences 
are unknown to the decision maker. This is relevant because intertemporal decisions taken 
with responsibility are ubiquitous. For example, managers make intertemporal choices as the 
representative of a firm that affects all employees. Politicians make decisions that affect their 
constituents as well as society. Moreover, if responsibility has an impact on intertemporal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
* Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft is gratefully acknowledged. 
47 This implies, at the same time, that a person puts off an onerous activity more than he would like from a prior 
perspective (Fischer, 2001; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999b, 2001). 
	   76	  
choices, it can affect the performance of a broad range of economic and social institutions, the 
depletion of non-renewable resources, and its further consequences even determines the 
economic prosperity of nations (Frederick et al., 2002). 
Responsibility can possibly affect two aspects that influence intertemporal decision-
making. First, the general level of patience – how much the person discounts rewards in the 
future – might be affected when someone else is involved. For example, managers may be 
more patient when making long run investment decisions for the firm to insure the financial 
stability and thus the employment security of their employees. Or, politicians display more 
impatience in their savings decisions because voters expect real-time outputs within the 
current legislative period. Second, being responsible for the welfare of another person may 
affect the time-consistency (degree of present bias) of choices. For example, managers are 
less likely to postpone tedious tasks if this endangers the salaries of their employees. Or, 
politicians are less likely to give in their present-bias if this harms their constituents. All the 
examples have a common feature: Neither a manager nor a politician knows the exact time 
preferences of their dependents. Hence, decisions have to be made based on the estimation of 
the preferences of the other person(s). This is in contrast to intertemporal choices made i.e. by 
parents who are responsible for their children, where the degree of patience of the dependents 
can be easily estimated.  
To analyze the impact of responsibility on intertemporal choices, we implement two 
treatments. In our main treatment, we introduce responsibility into a standard intertemporal 
decision problem where a principal chooses between a smaller-sooner and larger-later 
payment, with such payments being also the payoff of a passive dependent who is not taking 
part in the decision process. The control treatment is an intertemporal decision problem, 
where only the decision maker is affected, as in a standard experiment for intertemporal 
preferences. Both treatments consist of the same intertemporal trade-offs but only differ by 
the presence of responsibility. Thus, if decision makers maximize their payoffs without being 
affected by responsibility, there should be no differences between the treatments.  
The necessary condition that responsibility has an influence on choices is that it is 
salient to the decision maker that another person is affected by his choices, i.e. group saliency 
is the driving force for the difference in behavior between individual tasks and tasks with 
responsibility (Charness et al., 2007; Sutter, 2009). Group saliency can be created via payoff 
commonality and further increased by making the decision maker’s choices accountable to the 
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dependent by adding a feedback mechanism (Charness et al., 2007; Sutter, 2009).48 To ensure 
group saliency in the main treatment, we allow the passive dependent to observe the 
principal’s behavior by getting feedback about his choices after each round.  
The psychological literature argues that responsibility would lead to more patient 
behavior, irrespective of whether the dependent is acquainted with the time preferences of the 
principal or not, because the principal wants to appear as rational agent (Charness & Jackson, 
2009; Sutter, 2009). We offer an alternative explanation for the effect of responsibility on 
patience if the time preferences of the recipient are unknown to the principal. If the principal 
rationally maximize his payoff, being responsible for another person will not change 
behavior. If however, the principal’s utility is influenced by concerns for other players (i.e. 
Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000), he aggregates 
preferences by a weighted utility function. If preferences are the same for the principal and 
the recipient, behavior does not change with responsibility compared to the individual 
decision problem. However, agents might have heterogeneous discount factors (Jackson & 
Yariv, 2014). To ensure that the principal does not know the time preferences of the 
dependent, we choose a homogeneous subject pool of students to impede obvious signals 
about intertemporal consumption preferences such as age, income and education, which have 
been shown to be closely correlated with the level of patience (i.e. Laibson, 1997, 1998; 
Harrison et al., 2002). Then, the principal has to make his decisions based on his expectations 
about the dependent’s preferences. Depending on whether the principal expects the dependent 
to be more or less patient than himself, the aggregation of a weighted utility function will then 
lead to either more impatient or more patient choices. Moreover, in line with the 
argumentation of the psychological literature that consistent behavior is an important signal of 
personal and intellectual strength (Falk & Zimmermann, 2013), we expect to find more time-
consistency with responsibility. 
The main experimental findings are as follows. First, people decide more impatiently 
when they are responsible for the payoff of someone else. This is in line with our argument 
that principals use a weighted utility function of their own preferences and the unknown 
preferences of the recipient. Building on vast evidence from the psychological literature that a 
similar peer group leads to the better-than-average effect (Brown, 1986; Giladi & Klar, 2002; 
Gregg & Sedikides, 2004; Alicke & Govorun, 2005), the majority of principals seems to be 
overconfident about their own degree of patience, i.e. they expect the recipient to be more 
impatient than himself. Second, we find that choices are very time-consistent already in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Payoff commonality leads to group saliency not only in a strategic environment (Charness et al., 2007) but 
also in a non-strategic task without an out-group (Sutter, 2009).	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baseline, such that an increase in the measure is difficult to induce. Hence, our results confirm 
a preference for consistency, as suggested by Falk & Zimmermann (2013).  
The rest of the paper is structures as follows. Section 4.2 embeds the research question 
into the related literature. Section 4.3 encompasses the model and behavioral hypotheses. 
Section 4.4 presents the experiment in more detail. In section 4.5 the experimental results are 
analyzed. Section 4.6 concludes. 
 
4.2 Literature Review 
 
In recent years, various models of decisions assume a wider notion of self-interest (Sobel, 
2005; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006), where utility is not exclusively driven by monetary incentives 
but also by concerns for other players (Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; 
Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004). 
Considerable evidence shows that responsibility influences behavior. For example, laboratory 
evidence documents more conservative behavior in decisions under risk when one’s choices 
affect other’s welfare (Song, 2008; Charness & Jackson, 2009; Reynolds et al., 2009; Bolton 
& Ockenfels, 2010). Also, responsibility leads to a decrease in contributions to public goods 
(Charness et al., 2007; Sutter, 2009; Engel & Rockenbach, 2011; Humphrey & Renner, 2013). 
Sutter (2009) finds that salient group membership – where decisions are independent of others 
but influence them via payoff commonality – results in the same behavior as team 
membership, where several subjects have to agree on a joint decision and concludes, “both 
can be considered as substitutes” (p.2249).  
The literature about team behavior is very rich and agrees that decisions made in a 
group are typically closer to standard game theoretic predictions than individual decisions in a 
broad variety of strategic and non-strategic tasks (for a survey of the literature see Cooper & 
Kagel, 2005). For example, groups are more selfish in a dictator game (Luhan et al., 2009), 
send and accept smaller transfers in an ultimatum game (Bornstein & Yaniv, 1998), play more 
strategically than individuals in signaling games (Cooper & Kagel, 2005), exhibit greater 
compliance with the risk-return principle of the portfolio-selection-theory (Rockenbach et al., 
2007), trust less in a trust game (Kugler et al., 2007), cooperate less in a one-shot prisoner’s 
dilemma game (see Bornstein, 2003), exit significantly earlier than individuals in a centipede 
game (Bornstein et al., 2004), and groups outperform individuals with respect to effectiveness 
in a beauty contest game (Kocher & Sutter, 2005). Thus, it seems that responsibility, in 
general, lead to more “rational” behavior. The psychological literature explains this “cautious 
shift” by the desire of the decision maker to avoid being seen as an irrational agent (Charness 
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& Jackson, 2009). Applied to an intertemporal framework, the (psychological) literature 
therefore predicts responsibility to increase patience among intertemporal choices. 
 Next, we consider the effect of responsibility on time-consistency. The literature 
agrees, even though individuals are often aware that their dynamic inconsistent time 
preferences lead to outcomes that they will regret in the future, myopic players have 
difficulties to overcome their present bias. However, it seems that people are well aware of 
the fact that their present-biases hinder them to make the “right” choices and see the 
accomplishment to overcome present-biased preferences as rational goal. A suggested 
solution is to offer people to bind their behavior (Strotz, 1956; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981; 
Schelling, 1992; Wertenbroch, 1998).49 So far, empirical studies on self-control strategies 
have found that people, when giving the opportunity, use pre-commitment devices 
strategically in the anticipation of self-regulation failures (Wertenbroch, 1998; Trope & 
Fishbach, 2000; Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). Moreover, evidence from social psychology 
shows that consistent behavior is generally associated with personal and intellectual strength 
(Cialdini, 1993). Inconsistent behavior, on the other hand, is linked to undesirable personal 
characteristics (i.e. Asch, 1956; Allgeier et al., 1979). Falk & Zimmermann (2013) find that a 
key driver of consistent behavior is the role of signaling positive traits since consistent 
behavior is valued as a signal of ability. Hence, the presence of observers creates a 
particularly strong desire to appear consistent (Falk & Zimmermann, 2013). Based on these 
discourse insights, the literature assumes that responsibility leads to more time-consistency. 
 
4.3 Model and Hypotheses 
 
To derive predictions on the consequences of responsibility for decision-making in an 
intertemporal setting, we start from a model of choice that puts together both the elements we 
have discussed, namely patience and present bias. Such model is the quasi-hyperbolic 
decision model that we prefer to other models because of its tractability and relevance in the 
literature.50 The model is also directly testable and allows us to separate, both theoretically 
and empirically, the implications on impatience from those on present-bias.  
Decision is modeled as follows. Consider a decision-maker ! who maximizes a time-
additive discounted utility function, where !! is his cardinal instantaneous utility function in 
period ! and !! !! , !!!!,… , !!  represent his intertemporal preferences from the perspective 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Binding behavior is characterized by a strategic attempt to resist future temptations by voluntarily imposing 
(costly) constraints on future choices (Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). 50	  There also exist other models, such as models of willpower and temptation (Benabou & Tirole, 2004) or 
multiple selves’ models (i.e. Fudenberg & Levine, 2006) to capture present-biased preferences.	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of period !. The decision-maker has a discount factor ! ∈ (0,1), a present-bias parameter ! ≤ 1  and an increasing twice continuously differentiable utility function !  from 
consumption, such that  
 !! !! , !!!!,… , !! = !! + ! !!!!!!!!!! , for all !                              (4.1) 
 
In this formulation, !! represents the long run discount function and ! is the present-bias 
parameter. If !! = 1, the person is perfectly patient. If instead !! < 1, then future utility is 
discounted, and in particular a lower !! implies greater impatience. Moreover, ! = 1 means 
that a person is time-consistent. If, however ! < 1, the person’s per-period discount rate 
between now and next period is larger than the per-period discount rate between any two 
future periods. This captures exactly the problem of present-bias discussed above. Moreover, 
this discount structure results in preference reversals as function of time. 
Applying the quasi-hyperbolic discount framework to our setting, consider a binary 
decision problem in a close future framework, with !(!) representing the utility the decision-
maker gets when choosing the smaller-sooner amount available immediately, and !(!) the 
utility for the larger-later amount (where ! > !) available in ! periods. Consider also the 
same decision shifted forward by ! periods (into the far future), where the delay of receiving 
the larger-later amount is denoted by T. Then, the decision-maker chooses the larger-later 
payment ! in the close and far future if 
 !(!) < !!!!(!)                     (4.2) 
and !!!!(!) < !"!+!!(!)                                                    (4.3) 
 
Rewriting equations (4.2) and (4.3), the close and far future condition for delta in order to 
choose the larger-later payment becomes 
 !! > !(!)!"(!)                                                (4.4) 
 !! > !(!)!(!)                                     (4.5) 
 
We refer to these thresholds as patience thresholds. Comparing equations (4.4) and (4.5), it 
can be easily seen that the two equations only coincide when ! = 1, that is the case of time-
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consistency. If instead we have ! < 1, then the close future patience threshold is larger than 
the far future threshold, i.e. !! > !!, which implies to choose less often the larger-later reward 
in the close future than in the far future. Since !!!!" < 0,51 the smaller  !, the more heavily the 
larger-later payment is discounted in the close future, so the more likely is the decision-maker 
to choose the smaller-sooner payment. 
Now consider the case, where the decision-maker is a principal (denoted by P) who 
has to make a collective decision over streams of common consumption for himself and a 
dependent (denoted by D). The principal and the dependent have parameters !! , !! ∈ (0,1), !! ,!! ≤ 1, and utility functions !!(!), !!(!) and !!(!), !!(!), respectively. The definition 
of having social preferences is that the principal’s utility is influenced by concerns for the 
dependent, i.e. that !! depends on !!. Hence, the principal makes his decision based on a 
weighted utility function, with weights !! ,!! ∈ (0,1), such that !! + !! = 1. Moreover, we 
assume that some additional psychological costs enter the utility function if someone behaves 
inconsistently, in line with the presence of a preference for consistency. Let ! denote this cost 
of inconsistency, with ! = 0 if !! = 1 and ! > 0 if !! < 1.  Then, the principal chooses the 
larger-later payment in the close and far future trade-off if  
 !!!!(!) + !!!!(!) < !!!!!!!!!(!) + !!!!!!!!!(!) − !                       (4.6) 
 !!!!!!!!!(!) + !!!!!!!!!(!) < !!!!!!!!!!!(!) + !!!!!!!!!!!(!) − !               (4.7)                     
 
Rewriting equations (4.6) and (4.7), the principal’s patience thresholds in the close and far 
future become 
 !!! > !!(!)!!!!(!) + !! !!(!)!!!!!! !!(!) !!!!!!!!(!)                               (4.8) 
 !!! > !!(!)!!(!)   + !! !!(!)!!!!!!(!) !!!!!!(!)                                                    (4.9) 
 
Let`s first focus on the impatience parameter, !!! , and assume !! = !! = 1 (and thus ! = 0). 
Note, that the general level of patience is independent of whether the trade-off is asked in the 
close or far future. Comparing equations (4.8) and (4.9) to equations (4.4) and (4.5), it can be 
easily seen that the patience threshold increases with a decrease in !!! , which means that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  !  !!!" = ! !(!)!!!(!) < 0. 
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larger the degree of impatience of the dependent, the higher the patience needed for the 
principal to opt for the larger-later payment. There are three cases. If !!! = !!! , the condition to 
choose the larger-later payment becomes !!! > !!(!)!!(!), the same as in the individual case. 
Hence, if the preferences of the two agents are the same, then behavior with responsibility 
does not differ from individual choices. If instead !!! < !!! , i.e. the passive dependent is more 
patient than the principal, then the patience threshold, !!! , decreases and behavior becomes 
more patient. If, however, !!! > !!! , the opposite is true: The patience threshold increases, 
resulting in more impatient choices by the principal. We can now deduce the first hypothesis: 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4.1: If the principal’s utility is influenced by concerns for the dependent, 
responsibility leads to an increase in impatience among intertemporal choices if the principal 
expects himself to be more patient than the dependent, i.e. !!! > !!!  or a decrease in 
impatience if the principal expects himself to be more impatient than the dependent, i.e. !!! < !!! . If the principal expects the dependent to have the same time preferences as himself, 
i.e. !!! = !!! , behavior with responsibility does not differ from individual choices. 
 
Next, we analyze the effect of weighting utilities on time-consistency. Consider equation 
(4.8). Since !!!!!!! < 0,52 the patience threshold of the principal increases with the extent of the 
present-bias of the dependent. Thus, the larger the dependents bias for immediate 
gratification, i.e. the lower !!, the higher the patience threshold in the close future and the 
more likely is the principal to choose the smaller-sooner payment, which would lead to time-
inconsistent choices. However, if the principal has a preference for consistency, the 
psychological cost of displaying time-inconsistent behavior work in the opposite direction: 
The larger !, the more the principal wants to behave consistently. If the principal suffers 
enough from behaving inconsistently, he will behave more consistently when being 
responsible for someone else. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4.2: Responsibility and accountability lead to an increase in time-consistency 
among intertemporal choices if the principal has a preference for consistency. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 !!!!!!! = − !!!!!!!!! < 0. 
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4.4 Experimental Design and Procedures 
 
Our goal is to analyze how responsibility affects intertemporal choices. Our main treatment is 
an intertemporal choice task with responsibility (ICR), where we modify a standard time 
experiment. The decision maker (DM) is a principal whose choice is also the payoff of a 
passive dependent. The dependent bears the consequences of the choice without being able to 
actively take part in the decision process but can silently observe the DM’s choices. We then 
compare behavior with responsibility to a standard intertemporal choice task (ICI), where the 
DM’s choices only affect his own payoff. Moreover, no one observes the DM’s choices to be 
able to reveal his true preferences and therefore get his upper bound of impatience. Both 
treatments offer exactly the same monetary payoffs for the DM. However, the treatments vary 
by the presence of responsibility: In treatment ICR the DM is responsible for the payoff of a 
passive dependent, whereas in treatment ICI no other person is affected by his choice. 
 To estimate the impatience parameter, !!, we employ 40 trade-offs between a smaller-
sooner and a larger-later payment with varying money amounts and moments of payments.53 
To be able to identify present-biased preferences, we divide the choice trial into two blocks. 
20 trade-offs belong to the close future block, where the smaller-sooner payment is paid out 
one day after the experimental session (!!= tomorrow)54 and the larger-later amount with 
varying days of delay (!!!!= tomorrow+delay). We then add the same 20 trade-offs shifted 
forward by 30 days that depict the far future block, where the smaller-sooner payment is paid 
out in 30 days (!!"= in 30 days) and the larger-later payment with varying days if delay 
(!!"!!= in 30 days+delay). In our experiment, provided that !! is close enough in time and !!" 
is far enough in time, subjects with present-biased preferences should choose the smaller-
sooner payment if the trade-off is between !! and !!!! (display a present-bias in the trade-offs 
of the close future block), while they should reverse their preferences if the tradeoff is 
between !!" and !!"!! (wait for the same questions in the far future block). Hence, our design 
allows us to estimate jointly the impatience measure, !!, and the present-bias parameter, !!. 
Additionally, we calculate the patience threshold for the principal, !!! , which equalizes 
the present value of the delayed reward (PV) and the value for the smaller-sooner reward 
according to equation (4.1). Thus, we calculate !" = !!!!", where A the amount of the delayed 
reward, D the delay and !  the discount rate parameter with !! = !!!!"  representing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 With this wide range of questions we reduce the problem of noise which data from time-preference elicitation 
in the laboratory are especially sensitive to (Kirby & Herrnstein, 1995; Kirby, 1997). 
54 The earliest payment date was chosen to be the next day to eliminate the problem of front-end delay. 
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hyperbolic discount function. Table 4.1 presents all questions and the corresponding patience 
thresholds. 
TABLE 4.1: CHOICE TRIALS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED PATIENCE THRESHOLDS 	           	  
            Choice Trial Close Future     Choice Trial Far Future             !!!  
 
  1.       10.00€ tomorrow or 10.10€ in 21 days       10.00€ in 30 days or 10.10€ in 50 days       0.9900     
  2.         8.00€ tomorrow or   8.10€ in 27 days         8.00€ in 30 days or   8.10€ in 56 days       0.9877  
  3.         7.00€ tomorrow or   7.10€ in   6 days         7.00€ in 30 days or   7.10€ in 35 days       0.9859     
  4.       10.00€ tomorrow or 10.20€ in   3 days       10.00€ in 30 days or 10.20€ in 32 days       0.9804     
  5.         6.00€ tomorrow or   6.20€ in 13 days         6.00€ in 30 days or   6.20€ in 42 days       0.9675     
  6.       11.00€ tomorrow or 11.50€ in 29 days       11.00€ in 30 days or 11.50€ in 58 days       0.9571     
  7.         8.00€ tomorrow or   8.50€ in 11 days         8.00€ in 30 days or   8.50€ in 40 days       0.9469     
  8.         5.00€ tomorrow or   5.50€ in 18 days         5.00€ in 30 days or   5.50€ in 47 days       0.9117     
  9.         9.00€ tomorrow or 10.00€ in 31 days         9.00€ in 30 days or 10.00€ in 60 days       0.9000    
10.         7.00€ tomorrow or   8.20€ in 19 days         7.00€ in 30 days or   8.20€ in 48 days       0.8540     
11.         6.00€ tomorrow or   7.70€ in   5 days         6.00€ in 30 days or   7.70€ in 34 days       0.7792     
12.       11.00€ tomorrow or 14.20€ in   5 days       11.00€ in 30 days or 14.20€ in 34 days       0.7747     
13.         9.00€ tomorrow or 11.70€ in 15 days         9.00€ in 30 days or 11.70€ in 44 days       0.7695     
14.         4.00€ tomorrow or   5.60€ in 12 days         4.00€ in 30 days or   5.60€ in 41 days       0.7180     
15.         9.00€ tomorrow or 13.50€ in 31 days         9.00€ in 30 days or 13.50€ in 60 days       0.6662     
16.         7.00€ tomorrow or 10.60€ in   5 days         7.00€ in 30 days or 10.60€ in 34 days       0.6603     
17.         7.00€ tomorrow or 11.50€ in 12 days         7.00€ in 30 days or 11.50€ in 41 days       0.6089     
18.         5.00€ tomorrow or   8.60€ in 21 days         5.00€ in 30 days or   8.60€ in 50 days       0.5814     
19.         6.00€ tomorrow or 11.00€ in 11 days         6.00€ in 30 days or 11.00€ in 40 days       0.5453     
20.         4.00€ tomorrow or   7.70€ in   8 days         4.00€ in 30 days or   7.70€ in 37 days       0.5196     
 
Note: !!!  captures the minimum value of the hyperbolic discount function !!(!) at which the immediate and 
delayed rewards are of equal value to the principal. Trials are shown in decreasing order of !!! .  
 
In the table, the trade-offs are organized such that the patience threshold is decreasing. Note 
that the higher the discount function !!!  implied by the observed choice, the more patient a 
person is. For the first trade-off, the patience threshold is very high, which implies that 
choosing the larger-later payment requires a very high degree of patience (!!! ≥ 0.99). 
However, consider the last question (row 20). For this trade-off, choosing the larger-later 
payment requires less patience (!!! ≥ 0.5196). The average discount factor lies at around ! ! = 0.8 (for a meta analysis, see Frederick et al., 2002). Hence, we call trade-offs with a 
patience threshold above this value (choice 1-10 [21-30]) high patience threshold and expect 
less people to choose the larger-later payment than for trade-offs with a patience threshold 
below this value (choice 11-20 [31-40]), which we call low patience threshold.55  
The order of all 40 trade-offs was randomized and each choice was asked separately to 
avoid any order effects. Subjects were informed about the structure and number of trade-offs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Of course, it is also possible that subjects simply use heuristics for absolute monetary amounts (“I only wait 
for at least one Euro more”) as well as the waiting time (“I do not wait for more than 10 days”). 	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but not that the same trade-offs are present in the close future and in the far future (see 
instructions, Appendix 4.7.1). We opted for this procedure, instead of displaying the whole 
choice trial at once, to avoid that subjects could potentially bias their choices (maybe towards 
more consistent behavior). One round was randomly drawn to be payoff relevant. Earnings 
were transferred to each participant’s bank account at the specific date to unitize transaction 
costs among all participants. Moreover, the chair handed out a transferal guarantee to remove 
uncertainty about payments (see Appendix 4.7.2). Participants had the chance to leave before 
the experiment and get the show-up fee of 2.50 Euro if they did not want to or could give us 
their bank account details. In total, only one subject left the experiment. 
 The experiments were run at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Research. It was 
programmed and conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). In total, 182 
students recruited via the organizational software Orsee (Greiner, 2004) participated in the 
experiment; 64 subjects in treatment ICI and 118 subjects in treatment ICR. We used a 
between-subject design. In the ICR treatment, subjects were randomly assigned to role A 
(principal) and B (recipient) and then pairs of two were randomly formed (partner matching). 
In treatment ICI, all participants were principals. Thus, we have 64 independent observations 
in the control treatment and 59 independent observations in the responsibility treatment, 
yielding 123 independent observations in total. Each treatment consisted of three sessions. 
Each session lasted about 60 minutes. On average, subjects earned 8.93 Euro (about $12.16) 
in the experiment.  
 
4.5 Experimental Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Results 
 
The result section is structured as follows. First, we address the question of how responsibility 
influences patience. Next, we investigate whether present-biased time preferences change 
with responsibility. To complement the analysis, we then estimate the individuals’ discount 
function with maximum likelihood (MLE). 
First, people behave according to delta. With a decrease in the patience threshold, the 
share of people that opt for the larger-later payment (choice Y) increases, such that for the 
high patience threshold trade-offs, around 53 (48) percent of people wait in treatments ICI 
(ICR), whereas for the low patience threshold trade-offs, over 94 (91) percent wait (see Table 
4.2, upper part; see also Table 4.3). Second, the majority of people act highly consistently (see 
Table 4.2, lower part). Since we made it difficult for people to recognize that the same trade-
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offs are present both in the close and in the far future, it is unlikely that this time-consistent 
behavior is subject to potential biases towards consistent behavior induced by the design. 
 
TABLE 4.2: DECISIONS PER TREATMENT/ DISTRIBUTION OF TIME PREFERENCES 	  	                    Treatment 
 
                  ICI                   ICR  
                                    	   	       X  Y   X  Y	    
 
Overall Choices            25.90            74.10              29.15            70.85 
    High Threshold            47.42            52.58              51.95            48.05 
    Low Threshold              5.97            94.03                8.40            91.60 
 
                Future          Consistent          Present          Future           Consistent           Present             
 
Overall Choices    4.22              90.08           5.70    3.90                90.68           5.42 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Note: The upper part of Table 4.2 shows the percentages of X or Y chosen. The lower part of Table 4.2 
illustrates the distribution of time preferences per treatment. The numbers in both parts depict percentages; 
future=future-biased, consistent=time-consistent, and present=present-biased. N=32 for ICI and N=27 for ICR. 
 
 
Moving to the analysis of subject behavior in the treatments, we first analyze the effect of 
responsibility on the impatience parameter, !. Our evidence shows that, on average, choices 
are more impatient when made with responsibility. 
 
RESULT 4.1: People decide more impatiently when being responsible for someone else.  
 
Table 4.2 (upper part) depicts the shares of people that chose the smaller-sooner (choice X) or 
larger-later payment (choice Y). As can be seen, 74 percent choose Y in treatment ICI 
compared to 71 percent in ICR. This difference is significant (Two-sample test of proportion: 
p=0.0106). This result is also shown in Figure 4.1, which depicts impatient behavior, by 
showing the share of people that chose X per treatment. Both, in the close and in the far 
future, the share of people that chose the smaller-sooner payment is for all choices always 
larger in treatment ICR than in treatment ICI.  
As argued above, the principal does not know the discount parameter of the dependent 
and therefore has to base his choice on his expectations about !!! . The weighted discount 
function is lower than the individual discount function of the principal if the principal expects 
the discount parameter of the dependent to be smaller than his own, i.e. if he expects the 
dependent to be more impatient than himself. Hence, our result suggests that the majority of 
principals is overconfident about their own degree of patience and expect the dependent to be 
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more impatient than themselves. This is in line with the empirical evidence from social 
psychology that, when comparing oneself to the aggregate, any single member of a group 
tends to evaluate oneself above the group’s statistical mean (Giladi & Klar, 2002). The 
empirical evidence suggests that this “Better-than-average heuristic” is one of the most robust 
of all self-enhancement phenomena (Brown, 1986; Gregg & Sedikides, 2004), which 
especially arises when the characteristics of the peer group are similar (Alicke & Govorun, 
2005).  
 
FIGURE 4.1: PERCENTAGE OF X CHOSEN BOTH TREATMENTS 
 
 
Next, we focus on the present-biased parameter, !. Thus, we analyze subjects’ behavior in the 
two treatments, focusing on the time-consistency of choices. Result 4.2 shows that, on 
average, there is no difference in behavior between the treatments, i.e. subjects do not behave 
more time-consistently when another person’s payoff is affected.  
 
RESULT 4.2: We find a strong preference for consistency in both treatments. Overall, the 
time-consistency of choices is not increased by the introduction of responsibility.  
 
Support for result 4.2 is presented in Table 4.2 (lower part), which summarizes the 
distribution of time preferences in both treatments. The categorization is as follows. A choice 
is consistent if the subject chooses the same answer (X or Y) both in the close and in the far 
future. Instead, a choice is present-biased if a person chooses the sooner-smaller amount 
(choice X) in the close future whereas he opts for the larger-later reward (choice Y) in the far 
future. It is also possible to observe future-biased decisions. This is the case when a subject 
opts for the larger-later reward (choice Y) in the close future but chooses the sooner-smaller 
amount (choice X) in the far future time frame. 
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TABLE 4.3: DECISIONS PER CHOICE NUMBER 	  	       ICI     ICR 	   	                  X     Y   X  Y 
 
            Nr.              %              Nr.             %                    Nr.             %             Nr.            % 
Choice Number  
 1     47            73.44         17         26.56   45   76.27       14           23.73 
 2     46    71.88         18         28.12   45    76.27       14      23.73 
 3     39    60.94           25         39.06   36   61.02       23           38.98 
 4     34    53.13         30         46.87   34   57.63       25           42.37 
 5     38    59.38         26         40.62   35   59.32       24           40.68 
 6     27    42.19         37         57.81   27   45.76       32           54.24 
 7     28    43.75         36         56.25   26   44.07       33           55.93 
 8     20    31.25          44         68.75   27   45.76       32           54.24 
 9     21    32.81         43         67.19   19   32.20       40           67.80 
 10     15     23.44         49         76.56   16   27.12       43           72.88 
 11       5      7.81         59         92.19     8   13.56       51           86.44 
 12                      9    14.06         55         85.94     9   15.25       50           84.75 
 13       4      6.25         60         93.75     6   10.17       53           89.83 
 14       4      6.25           60         93.75     5     8.47       54           91.53 
 15       2      3.13         62         96.87     6   10.17       53           89.83 
 16       1      1.56         63         98.44     2     3.39       57           96.61 
 17       1      1.56         63         98.44     3     5.08       56           94.92 
 18       0        0.00         64       100.00     2     3.39       57           96.61 
 19       0      0.00         64       100.00     1     1.69       58           98.31 
 20       0      0.00         64       100.00     1     1.69       58           98.31  
 21     49    76.56         15         23.44   46   77.97       13      22.03 
 22     47    73.44          17         26.56   45   76.27       14        23.73 
 23     33    51.56         31         48.44   38   64.41       21           35.59 
 24     29            45.31         35         54.69   27   45.76       32           54.24 
 25     32            50.00           32         50.00   36   61.02       23           38.98 
 26     27    42.19        37         57.81   31   52.54       28           47.46 
 27     24    37.50         40         62.50   27   45.76       32           54.24 
 28     20    31.25        44         68.75   21   35.59       38           64.41 
 29     18    28.13         46         71.87   14   23.73       45           76.27 
 30     13    20.31        51         79.69   18   30.51       41           69.49 
 31       7    10.94        57         89.06   11   18.64       48           81.36 
 32       7    10.94        57         89.06   10   16.95       49           83.05 
 33       6      9.38        58         90.62     4     6.78       55           93.22 
 34       4      6.25        60         93.75     5     8.47       54           91.53 
 35       1      1.56        63         98.44     1     1.69       58           98.31 
 36       2      3.13        62         96.87     1     1.69       58           98.31 
 37       1      1.56         63          98.44     0     0.00       59         100.00 
 38       1      1.56        63          98.44     0     0.00       59         100.00 
 39       1      1.56        63          98.44     0     0.00       59         100.00 
 40       0      0.00        64        100.00     0     0.00       59         100.00 	  
 
In treatment ICI over 90 percent of choices are time-consistent, around 4 percent are future-
biased and around 6 percent are present-biased. A similar picture arises in treatment ICR, 
where around 91 percent of choices are time-consistent, 4 percent are future-biased, and 5 
percent are present-biased. The difference in time-consistent, and present-biased choices 
between treatments is not significant (Two-sample test of proportion, consistent: p=0.6144; 
present-biased: p=0.7627). Since already in the baseline treatment over 90 percent of people 
behaves perfectly consistently, a further increase in this measure is difficult to induce.56 This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 This is a very untypical result compared to general findings in the literature, where normally 30 to 40 percent 
of subjects do have present-biased preferences (for an overview see Frederick et al., 2002). 
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high share of consistent choices  - even though the randomization of all 40 choices induced by 
our design aggravated consistent behavior – confirms the findings of Falk & Zimmermann 
(2013) that players seem to have a (considerable) preference for consistency.  
 
4.5.2 Statistical Specification 
 
To further test the descriptive results, we estimate the individuals’ discount functions by 
maximum likelihood. Under exponential discounting, it is given by: 
 u!,! = mδ!                                                                                (4.10) 
 
where m is the monetary amount, δ is the discount factor, and ! is the number of days of 
delay until the payment is received. Based on the descriptive results presented in the former 
section, the vast majority of individuals behave time-consistently in our experiment. To 
capture these behavioral patterns, we start with the exponential discounting model, which is, 
by construction, time-consistent. Including an effect of the treatment condition on the 
discount parameter, the model simply becomes: 
 u!,! = m(!!"! + ∆!ICR)!                                                              (4.11) 
 
where ∆!ICR  captures the change in the discount factor due to the treatment, i.e. the 
introduction of responsibility (indicated with ICR). The descriptive results indicate a tendency 
towards less patient choices, which would mean that the change in the discount factor should 
be negative, i.e. ∆!< 0. 
The model can be easily extended to accommodate a non-linear functional form of 
utility of income: 
 u!,! = m∝(!!"! + ∆!ICR)!                                                           (4.12) 
 
Now, we estimate this function in one step with full maximum likelihood. To estimate the 
model and test for the main hypotheses, we pool all 59x40 choices between the smaller-
sooner and the larger-later payments. To account for the fact that the choices by the 59 
individuals are not independent of each other, we compute cluster-robust standard errors. 
Moreover, we compute confidence intervals using bootstrap instead of relying on the 
normality assumption. Normality seems to be unlikely to hold in our case. Bootstrap works 
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even if the normality assumption is relaxed but is also consistent with a normal distribution. 
Moreover, in many cases bootstrap confidence intervals have proved to be better than 
asymptotic normal ones. Table 4.4 reports the estimated coefficient of model (4.12) 
employing clusters at the individual level and confidence intervals computed with bootstrap.  
As can be seen, subjects have, on average, a pretty high discount factor already in the 
baseline treatment ICI, being !!"! = 0.99689. This means they are very patient. Second, ∝ is 
significantly lower than 1, so the utility is increasing in money but at a decreasing rate. Next, 
consider the change in ! induced by the introduction of responsibility, ∆!. We have ∆!< 0, so 
subjects in the responsibility treatment have a lower discount factor, i.e. behave more 
impatiently in the ICR treatment than in the ICI treatment. Since the baseline is roughly 1, it 
is easy to get an idea of the magnitude of this effect. The change in !  induced by 
responsibility is −0.293% . Despite the relatively small effect on the general level of 
impatience, the bootstrap confidence interval shows that the coefficient is significant at 5% 
level. Hence, result 4.1 can be fortified: Responsibility leads to an increase in impatience 
among choices. Thus, hypothesis 4.1 cannot be rejected. 
 
TABLE 4.4: ESTIMATES EXPONENTIAL MODEL, POOLED DATA AND CLUSTERS 	  
Estimates                         (4.12)           (4.13)                         (4.14)  
 
Discount factor (!!"!)                             .99689**           .99661**          .99644** 
                                  (.00134)	   	         (.00132)	  	   	         (.00126)  
                                                         [.99604 .99768]  [.99562 .99748]     [.99539 .9974] 
Responsibility (∆!)       -.00293**        -.00298**         -.00259** 
         (.00213)	  	   	         (.00216)	  	   	         (.00179) 
                                                        [-.00418 -.00171]             [-.00427 -.00175]                [-.00406 -.00111] 
Curvature of u(∙) (∝)                .82502**           .82469**          .82476**   
                                  (.02822)	  	   	         (.02848)	  	   	         (.02835) 
                                                         [.79611 .84714]                [.79526 .84668]    [.79549 .84679] 
Time Inconsistency factor !             .01314            .02058**   
            (.0133)	  	   	         (.01762) 
                     [-.0006 .0234]    [.00239 .03428] 
Responsibility on TI factor (∆!)                  -.01623 
                (.02731) 
                          [-.04443 .005] 
 
Number of iterations:              5    7   8 
Log likelihood:       -1091.2246       -1090.40935       -1090.10238 
 
No. of. Obs.:           2360             2360             2360 	  
Note: Standard errors are given in round brackets. The bootstrap confidence intervals are given in square 
brackets. ** denote significance on the 5% level.  
 
	   91	  
Next, we analyze time-consistency. We simply include an additional parameter to model the 
present bias. We therefore adopt an empirical version of the quasi-hyperbolic discounting 
model to be able to separate the impatience parameter from the present-bias. Then, the 
empirical model is: 
 u!,! = m∝(1 − !Ι!!!)(!!"! + ∆!ICR)!                                                     (4.13) 
 
Note that we parameterize the present-bias parameter, β, as ! = 1 − ! . If a subject has 
present-biased time preferences, we expect to find ! > 0. In case of time-consistency we have ! = 0. The second element of the present-bias parameter is the indicator function Ι!!!, which 
takes the value 1 if the payment is made in one day. This captures the present-bias in a way 
that is consistent with the quasi-hyperbolic framework.57  
Table 4.4 also reports the estimated coefficients of model (4.13). Note that the 
baseline impatience parameter, !!"!, the treatment effect on impatience, ∆!, as well as the 
curvature parameter, ∝, are almost unaffected by the introduction of the new parameter. The 
new parameter, !, is positive (as expected) but quite small in size and not significant.  
Finally, we test the effect of responsibility on time-consistency. We introduce a model 
that puts both treatment effects together: 
 u!,! = m∝(1 − (!!"! + ∆!ICR)Ι!!!)(!!"! + ∆!ICR)!                                           (4.14) 
 
The estimated coefficients for (4.14) are reported in the last column of Table 4.4. Note that !!"!, ∆!, and ∝ do not change much compared to the former models. However, when we 
control for the effect of responsibility on time-consistency, we find that the confidence 
interval for the baseline parameter, !, suggests that our representative decision maker is 
actually present-biased (even though the absolute value of the present bias is very small). The 
coefficient of ∆! is negative but not significantly different from 0. Hence, we do not find a 
significant increase in time-consistency with responsibility and therefore can reject hypothesis 
4.2 based on the estimate of ∆!. However, the direction of the coefficients is in line with the 
hypothesis that social image concerns increase the taste for consistency.  
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Note that the definition of what is exactly the close future is subject to the specific application. In our setting, 
the immediate date is tomorrow to (a) unitize transaction costs among individuals and (b) remove any problem 
of front-end delay. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This study investigates the effect of responsibility on intertemporal decision-making. 
Intertemporal choices, i.e. individual savings and investment decisions are ever-present in life 
and some of them have severe consequences for the well being of a person. However, many 
of such choices do not only have consequences for the decision maker but also affect the 
welfare of other people who do not actively take part in the decision process. If this is the case 
than the intertemporal choice is made with responsibility. In this study, we address such 
choices made with responsibility for an unknown person with similar demographic 
characteristics, i.e. age and income, such that the time preferences of the dependent are not 
easy to infer but have to be estimated by the decision maker. Even though these choices are 
ubiquitous, as to our knowledge, there is no study that analyzes the influence of responsibility 
in intertemporal decision-making. We address this loophole in the literature by offering a 
novel experimental setting, where we introduce responsibility in a standard intertemporal 
decision problem. A principal chooses between payments due at different times, with such 
payments being also the payoff of a passive dependent who is not taking part in the decision 
problem but (silently) observes the principal’s behavior. We then compare behavior to the 
same choices made without responsibility. The results show that responsibility leads to a shift 
towards more impatience among choices. This can be explained by social preferences, where 
utility is influenced by concerns for other players (i.e. Rabin, 1993; Levine, 1998; Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). Hence, to incorporate both his own as well as the 
dependent’s time preferences, the principal aggregates utility by a weighted utility function. 
Since the principal does not know the time preferences of the dependent, and there are no 
obvious signals about the other person’s utility functions, the principal has to estimate the 
dependent’s discount factor. The better-than-average effect infers that the principals are 
overconfident about their own degree of patience, i.e. they expect the recipient to be more 
impatient than themselves and, hence, the aggregation of a weighted utility function leads to 
more impatient choices. Our results are further strengthened by the fact that, in our main 
treatment, the passive dependent observes the principals’ choices. Social image concerns 
would work in the opposite direction and should induce the principal to behave more 
patiently. Yet, we still find the effect of a shift towards more impatience. This indicates that 
the utility weighting outweighs social image concerns. 
Another possible explanation for the shift towards more impatience could be that 
responsibility is used as an excuse to behave impatiently. Since the time preferences of the 
recipient are unknown, the principal can justify (to himself as well as to others) falling into 
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the temptation of behaving impatiently by shifting the blame onwards to the recipient. The 
two explanations are similar but the behavioral motivation is different; the former explanation 
is based on an altruistic assumption, whereas the latter is not. Yet, in the individual 
intertemporal choice task, neither an observer nor a dependent is present. Thus, people state 
their preferences without any external influence, such as social image concerns or social 
preferences. Since the mechanism is incentive compatible, behavior in our control treatment 
should therefore already display the upper bound of impatience. Hence, we can exclude the 
argument that principals use the dependent as an excuse for the disclosure of their true degree 
of impatience.  
Moreover, our results confirm a preference for consistency, as suggested by Falk & 
Zimmermann (2013). In both treatments, over 90 percent of choices are consistent. The 
psychological literature argues that consistent behavior is associated with intellectual and 
personal strength (Cialdini, 1993), whereas inconsistent behavior is an undesirable personal 
characteristic (i.e. Asch, 1956; Allgeier et al., 1979). Falk & Zimmermann (2013) find that the 
key driver of consistent behavior is to signal positive traits. However, in our experiment, 
already in the baseline treatment, where social image concerns do not play a role, we find that 
choices are very time-consistent even if the experimental design made it especially difficult to 
behave consistently. Since consistency is already at its upper bound, an increase in this 
parameter is difficult to infer. However, the coefficient goes in the right direction, which is in 
line with the argument that social image concerns increase the taste for consistency. 
 The experimental setting suggested in this study extends the existing literature by 
incorporating responsibility into a typical intertemporal choice task. By suggesting an 
experimental design that analyzes time preferences when another person is affected by the 
decision maker’s choice, it enhances the comprehension of behavioral regularities that might 
govern decision-making in an intertemporal context.  
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4.7 Appendix  
4.7.1 Experimental Instructions 
 
General Information [*PCFeed] 
 
Welcome to this experiment and thank you very much for your participation. Please read 
these instructions carefully. Please switch off your mobile phone and do not communicate 
with any other participant anymore. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. One of 
the experimenters will then come to your table and answer your question personally. 
 
You can earn money in this experiment. The amount earned depends on your decisions as 
well as the decisions of other participants made during the experiment. All decisions made 
during the experiment as well as your final earnings remain anonymous. 
 
This experiment consists of 40 rounds. In each round, you [*or another participant has] have 
to make a decision. After all participants have made their decisions, one of the rounds is 
randomly chosen to be payoff-relevant at the end of the experiment; thereby, the probability 
of being chosen is exactly the same for all rounds. 
 
The timing of the payment depends on the choices you have made [* that has been made] in 
the round that has been randomly chosen. The payoff from the randomly selected round will 
be transferred to your bank account. We assure you the certainty of your future payments. 
Additionally, each participant gets a show-up fee of 2.50 Euro, which is independent of the 
decisions made during the experiment and will be paid out to you cash at the end of the 
experiment.  
 
All payment dates in this experiment are the date, where the bank transfer is disposed.  
 
You find the exact description of the experiment on the following pages. 
 
The Experiment 
 
[*At the beginning of the experiment, you are randomly assigned to role A or B. Each 
participant with role A is randomly matched with a participant with role B. You will never 
learn the identity of the participant that you have been matched with. The matching remains 
constant during the whole experiment.] 
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This experiment consists of 40 rounds. In each round, you have [*participant A has] the 
choice between option X and option Y. The options offer different payoff alternatives, where 
the monetary amount as well as the timing of the payment, vary. In each round, you have 
[*participant A has] the choice between an amount, which will be transferred to you [*him as 
well as participant B] at an earlier date, and a larger amount, which will be transferred to you 
[*him as well as participant B] at a later date. [*This means that participant A decides about 
his own payoff as well as the payoff of participant B. Participant B does not make any active 
decision. However, participant B is informed about participant A’s choices after each round.] 
[Only T1: Please think carefully about each choice and choose the option you prefer.]  
 
Here is an example:  
 
Option X            Option Y         Your Choice 
 [A:] 9 Euro tomorrow  10 Euro in 5 days               X      Y 
[B: 9 Euro tomorrow]   [10 Euro in 5 days] 
 
 
If you choose [participant A chooses] option X, you prefer [he prefers] 9 Euro tomorrow to 10 
Euro in 5 days. If this round is randomly selected to be payoff-relevant, you [participant A as 
well as participant B] earn 9 Euro in this experiment, which will be transferred to your [both] 
bank account [accounts] tomorrow. 
 
If you choose [participant A chooses] option Y, you prefer [he prefers] 10 Euro in 5 days to 9 
Euro tomorrow. If this round is randomly selected to be payoff-relevant, you [participant A as 
well as participant B] earn 10 Euro in this experiment, which will be transferred to your 
[both] bank account [accounts] in 5 days. 
 
End of the Experiment 
 
At the end of the experiment, the team will hand out a questionnaire. Please fill in the answers 
truthfully. When the experiment is finished, please remain seated and wait until the 
experimenter will call your seat number. Please fill in your bank account details, the amount 
you earned as well as the date of transferal in the destined remittance slip and take it with you 
when you come to the front. The team will hand out a certificate for your participation and the 
amount you will get transferred in the future and additionally pay you 2.50 Euro in cash.  
 
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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4.7.2 Certificate for Transferal of Earnings 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis presents three studies that examine the impact of non-standard preferences on 
consumption decisions in several economic settings. To be more precise, we analyze potential 
influences of non-standard preferences on contribution behavior in a social dilemma (chapter 
2), cooperation in intertemporal decision-making (chapter 3) and the effect of responsibility 
on intertemporal choices (chapter 4). The starting point for each research project is the 
assumption that non-standard preferences alter economic decision-making. In each study, a 
laboratory experiment is implemented to analyze behavioral regularities and explore their 
relevance in the different economic contexts. 
 Chapter 2 analyzes the endogenous formation of a sanction institution in a public 
goods game. The aim is to address potential enforcement problems by – instead of letting 
sanctions be executed by a central authority ex-post – allowing players to regulate their own 
punishment ex-ante in a decentralized way. To do so, subjects are offered to pre-commit to 
contributions before the actual public goods game is played. The results show that the vast 
majority of players voluntarily pre-commit to contributions and the possibility of institution 
formation positively influences cooperation and group welfare. Even though the pre-
commitment device is designed such that players can only punish themselves for contributing 
to less and the punishment is independent of group contributions, players repudiate free-riding 
behavior on the institution. The results therefore stress the importance of fairness 
consideration within the institution formation process. This is in line with considerable 
evidence that a taste for fairness and equality affects economic behavior in many important 
areas (for an overview, see Fehr & Gächter, 2000b; Camerer, 2003).  
Our results has important implications for the design of institutions; it is good news 
that fairness leads to higher efficiency levels than if fairness motives were irrelevant. 
However, fairness considerations also have to be considered as a limitation on equilibria and 
might impede the institution formation process by increasing the likelihood that the 
implementation of the institution fails. Therefore, fairness motives should be taken into 
account ex ante.  
 The experimental setting complements the existing literature by combining the 
endogenous formation of institutions in a public goods game with a pre-commitment 
mechanism. Based on the recent literature that suggests that a social dilemma also presents a 
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self-control dilemma (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011; Kocher et al., 2012; 
Martinsson et al., 2012), the mechanism presented in this study can help players to overcome 
self-control problems in the anticipation of self-regulatory failure.  
 The idea that a social dilemma also represents self-control dilemma, where the 
individual has to trade off the objective of acting pro-socially and the temptation to act 
selfishly has been recently discussed in the enforcement literature. The experimental evidence 
reported so far suggests that a high level of self-control leads to significantly higher 
contributions in a public goods game if this is perceived as a self-control conflict (Kocher et 
al., 2012; Martinsson et al., 2012) and that impatient individuals contribute less to the public 
good than patient ones (Curry et al., 2008; Fehr & Leibbrandt, 2011, Kocher et al., 2012). 
However, all these studies measure the individual degree of self-control independently from 
the contribution decision in the public good game, where the choice tasks to elicit time 
preferences consist of lotteries that embrace payoffs that differ very much from those in the 
cooperation game. Most importantly, the typical choice task to elicit time preferences does 
not involve a second person. Rather, the decision maker makes choices that only affect his 
own payoff and therefore his decisions are made in a socially detached environment. 
However, if social dilemmas represent a self-control conflict, any choice involves both a 
temporal as well as a social dimension and it is possible that the choice differs profoundly for 
the decision maker if the intertemporal decision is made in interaction with another person.  
 To approach this problem, chapter 3 focuses on the interplay between time and social 
preferences based on joint elicitation. The experimental setting introduces a novel element to 
the existing literature by bringing a standard time preference experiment into a social 
dimension. The results suggest that – when both preferences are elicited jointly – the social 
component outweighs individual self-control problems in a cooperation game. This finding 
has implications for policy decisions, i.e. with respect to the provision of public goods. 
Contradictory to previous findings in the literature, it suggests that the probability to 
contribute to a public good does not depend on the timing of the decision. 
  Moreover, the study opened the question of how responsibility might influence 
intertemporal choices. Chapter 4 addresses this question by studying the influence of 
responsibility on intertemporal decision-making. To do so, we introduce responsibility into a 
standard intertemporal choice task. Our results show that the decisions made with 
responsibility reflect more impatience. This is consistent with a model where a weighted 
utility function results in a shift towards impatience if the time preferences of the recipients 
are unknown to the principal and the latter is overconfident about his own degree of patience.  
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 Chapter 3 and 4 both focus on intertemporal decision-making in (different aspects of) 
a social context. By suggesting an experimental design for the joint elicitation of time and 
social preferences based on a cooperation (trust) game, as well as for the integration of 
responsibility in an intertemporal choice task, both studies contribute to the understanding of 
behavioral regularities that might govern the choices in an intertemporal context with social 
interaction.  
 Summing up, all three studies suggest that other-regarding preferences influence 
behavior. This finding is in line with various models of decisions that assume that utility is 
not solely influenced by monetary gains but also by concerns for other players (Rabin, 1993; 
Levine, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002; 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger, 2004; Sobel, 2005; Fehr& Schmidt, 2006). Specifically, our 
results show that fairness considerations are important for public goods provision (Chapter 2), 
concerns for other players can outweigh individual problems of self-control (Chapter 3), and 
being responsible for the welfare of another person influences behavior (Chapter 4). 
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